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ABSTRACT 
CHAUDHRI, IMRAN  The Effect of Electronic Medical Record Sophistication on U.S. 
Hospital Department Efficiency.  Department of Economics, June 2013 
ADVISOR: Professor Tomas Dvorak 
 
A key concern in emergency departments (EDs) is their overall efficiency,  One 
proposed solution to making EDs more efficient is the use of electronic medical records 
(EMRs).  This paper seeks to determine if varying levels of EMR sophistication have an 
effect on measures of emergency department efficiency. 
 Furukawa (2011) found that EMR sophistication had varying effects on ED 
efficiency.  Fully functional EMRs significantly improved ED efficiency in multiple 
measures, while basic EMR varied on its effects on efficiency.  Since Furukawa’s results are 
somewhat inconclusive, this study aims to see if these effects are longstanding.  I hypothesize 
that as EMR became more established, their effect on efficiency would become stronger.  To 
this end, I used the 2009 National Hospital Ambulatory Care Survey (NHAMCS).  I found 
that EMR sophistication does not have a strong association with ED efficiency.  Five 
separate OLS regressions were used for five measures of ED efficiency.  In order to account 
for possible endogeneity within the EMR related regressors, instrumental variables were 
used.  In summary, based on the findings of this study and previous literature, it would seem 
that EMR sophistication does not conclusively affect ED efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Emergency departments (EDs) are integral in the US healthcare system today.  The 
volume of ED patients has been increasing recently; the number of ED visits increased by 
32% between 1999 and 2009.  This increase in ED volume has led to substantial ED 
overcrowding and increased wait times (Hing and Bhuiya 2012).  This is a major concern 
because emergency departments represent a vital part of the health care safety net in the US.  
The emergency department treats even those that do not have insurance and if overcrowding 
exists, these patients can not come to the ED to receive care.  Overcrowding can reduce the 
safety of patients and can increase worries about public health if treatment takes longer than 
it should (Trzeciak and Rivers 2003).  Patient flow and throughput can be affected by ED 
overcrowding, resulting in adverse patient health outcomes and patients going without care 
(Furukawa 2011).  Although overcrowding may be the result of multiple and varied reasons, 
one proposed solution is the use of health information technology, specifically electronic 
medical records. 
 
1.1  Background Information on Electronic Medical Records 
 Over the last twenty years, information technologies (IT) have dominated various 
industries, but only recently has it begun to have an impact on the healthcare industry 
(Hillestad et al.2005).  Health care takes as many as 10-15 years to adopt information 
technologies when compared to other industries.  The move towards a more technological 
medical setting began in the late 1960s and since then the US government has spent billions 
of dollars in order to automate certain health records systems.  This has been evidenced in the 
various Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems arising such as the HealtheVet/VistA 
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system for Veteran Affairs (VA) hospitals and the Composite Health Care System (CHCS-II) 
for the Department of Defense.  EHRs are said to be a building block of Health Information 
technology and they are talked about the most when it comes to health information 
technology.  The problem with various EHR systems is that they can not transfer information 
between themselves (Goldschmidt 2005).  Beginning in 1991, the Institute of Medicine has 
stated their strong belief that increased EHR would lead to improved health care quality 
(Romano and Strafford 2011).  In 2004, President George W. Bush created the National 
Coordinator of Health Information Technology.  The National Coordinator was tasked with 
making an EHR a reality for the majority of US residents within 10 years (Goldschmidt 
2005).  This goal may become easier to complete with the passing of the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) provisions of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Romano and Strafford 2011).  HITECH has made 
the implementation of a nationally interoperable health information system a priority (Jha et 
al. 2009).  Electronic Medical Records (EMR) refer to electronic records of patient medical 
data.  Electronic Health Records (EHR) refer to a health information system that connects 
patients physicians and other medical personnel for the collective sharing of pertinent 
information.  EMRs are required to be in place successfully before successful EHRs can be 
implemented (Garets and Davis 2006).  This paper will focus solely on EMRs. 
 
1.2 Potential Effects of EMR 
EMRs are believed to have great potential effects on the quality of care, patient 
health, and costs of care.  EMRs could reduce costs of care by eliminating costs of record 
keeping, improving workflow and efficiency, reducing medical error and repeat of tests, and 
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reducing the risk of malpractice lawsuits.  EMRs could also improve the quality of health by 
reducing medical error and allowing for more transparency between different health care 
providers in an institution (Goldschmidt 2005).  
 The potential benefits of implementing an EMR system also depends on the level of 
sophistication the EMR has.  EMR sophistication refers to the number of functionalities the 
EMR has.  Certain EMR functionalities may have profound effects on quality of health such 
as clinical decision support systems (Romano and Strafford 2011).  Other functionalities such 
as clinical documentation systems can increase the efficacy of charting patient information.  
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) could possibly decrease the need to spend more 
time at the pharmacist.  Very advanced EMRs may be able to coordinate care beyond the 
emergency room through an integrated hospital care system (Furukawa 2011). 
 
1.3 Importance of Studying EMRs in the ED 
 Emergency departments represent key areas in hospitals where EMR might provide 
increased utility.  In these areas of the hospital, the patients and physicians have limited prior 
interaction, if any at all.  In addition to this, these centers tend to be highly trafficked and 
having an EMR may reduce costs and wasteful procedures in general.  ED physicians do not 
know about the patients they are going to receive and thus accessing patient paper records in 
a timely manner is unlikely. Lastly, some patients that enter the ED may not be in a stable 
mental condition and thus would not be able to convey their precise medical condition 
accurately (Geisler et al. 2010).  This contrasts with EMRs in a physician office setting, 
which are used also for the coordination of care, but also for the storing of ongoing patient 
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information (Bates et al. 2002).  The degree to which a hospital uses an EMR system could 
have profound effects on the hospital’s care and efficiency of their emergency departments.   
 
1.3.1 Importance of Measuring Efficiency in the ED: Wait times 
 EMRs can help improve efficiency in the ED in multiple ways.  One such way is to 
reduce ED wait times.  ED overcrowding results in substantial wait times in the ED.  
Increased wait times have multiple consequences.  Longer wait times can lead to dissatisfied 
patients (Hunt and Glucksman 1991).  It has been shown that ED crowding has increased 
wait times as does the location of the hospital, urban hospitals having longer wait times than 
rural hospitals.  The patient acuity level, how quickly the patient must be seen, also has a 
strong effect on wait time.  Patients that need to be seen most quickly wait the least amount 
of time.  In theory this seems fair, but patients that have minor conditions end up waiting 
longer than recommended for their condition because overcrowding exists (Hing and Bhuiya 
2012).  EMRs can possibly reduce these wait times by providing better regulated treatment 
and quicker laboratory and imaging results.  Also certain EMR systems include discharge 
planning and automatic notification for beds, which in turn would improve ED wait times  
(Furukawa 2011).   
 
1.3.2 Importance of Measuring Efficiency in the ED: Ambulance Diversion 
 Overcrowding additionally also results in ambulance diversions.  Ambulance 
diversions occur when an emergency room is too crowded and can not accept any more 
patients so an incoming ambulance is diverted to another hospital.  This can lead to delayed 
care for those in immediate need of it and can in some cases lead to transport-associated 
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deaths (Redelmeier et al. 1994).  Handel and McConnell (2008) found that ambulance 
diversions actually lead to greater revenues for the hospital as the hospital electively chooses 
their patients.  Thus no incentive exists from a monetary standpoint for a hospital to reduce 
their ambulance diversion times.  Reducing ambulance diversion, though, can lead to 
increased quality of care and access to care.   EMRs can reduce ambulance diversion times 
by reducing overcrowding in the ED.  Thus EMRs have the potential to improve access to 
care and quality of health this way. 
 
1.3.3 Importance of Measuring Efficiency in the ED: Test and Medication Orders 
 EMRs have the potential to improve the way tests and medications are ordered in the 
ED.  Sophisticated EMRs are able to coordinate care effectively and allow for more timely 
administering of tests and medications. With medications and tests being administered more 
efficiently and in a more timely manner, patients can be seen more effectively, be given the 
care they require more efficiently, and be moved through the ED at a better pace and thus 
increase patient throughput (Marshall and Chin 1998).  
 
1.3.4 Unintended Consequences of Implementing an EMR System 
 There can be adverse effects between EMRs and these measures of efficiency as well.  
It is possible that EMR implementation can lead to increased wait times instead of reducing 
them.  Depending on the EMR, EMR use can lead to increased computer time and less time 
speaking with the patient directly, thus leading to dissatisfaction (Furukawa 2011).  Also 
implementing an EMR can take some time, and during the initial period of implementation, 
wait times may increase as health care providers adjust to the new system (Baron et al. 2005).  
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EMRs can also affect the number of tests ordered in an undesirable way.  As physicians gain 
access to more lab results through a computerized system, they might have more of an 
incentive to order tests since the results are so much more available to them.  Thus EMR 
systems may not reduce the ordering of unnecessary tests, but may in fact increase the use of 
them (McCormick et al. 2012).   
 
1.4 Focus of the Study 
 The following study aims to see if the sophistication of an EMR system based on the 
varying included functionalities increases ED efficiency as measured by wait times, 
ambulance diversion, readmission rates, and the number of tests ordered.  Data was used 
from the National Health Ambulatory Care Survey (NHAMCS) for the years 2006 through 
2009.  NHAMCS is a survey conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, a 
division of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  I hypothesized that higher 
levels of EMR sophistication lead to higher levels of overall ED efficiency.   
 
1.5 Contribution to Existing Literature  
 This paper will add to the existing literature since it uses more recent data than other 
papers on this topic. Research on the topic of EMR and its effects has been very 
inconclusive.  Some research shows possible effects while others show complete lack of any 
effect. This paper adds to this research by showing that even up to a point more recently 
where EMRs are more implemented, there are still no conclusive results or improvements in 
efficiency as caused by the implementation of an EMR system.  
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1.6 Outline of the Paper  
 I will first describe the previous literature on this topic and how this paper will 
contribute to this existing body of work.  Then will follow Section 2, a discussion of the 
methods used in this paper, including all the variables used and the regression techniques 
used for analysis. Section 4 will discuss the results of the study and Section 5 will end the 
paper with a discussion of the results and their implications, including a discussion of the 
limitations of the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
EMRs have the potential to increase the efficiency of healthcare providers and 
improve health outcomes (Jha et al. 2009).  Financial incentives were created for physicians 
and hospitals through Medicare and Medicaid for "meaningful use" of EMR systems as well 
(Geisler et al. 2010).  Unfortunately, the research conducted up to now on the topic of EMR 
has not been entirely conclusive on what effects EMR can have.  The literature on EMR falls 
into the following four categories: EMR’s Potential, EMR Implementation, Meaningful Use 
of EMR, and Effects of EMR Implementation. 
 
2.1 EMR’s potential if implemented 
 EMRs are believed to have large potential benefits after their implementation.  Wang 
et al. (2003) conducted a cost-benefit analysis of using an EMR for physician primary care 
practices.  They found that up to possibly $86,400 per provider can be saved through the use 
of EMRs.  This value can go higher depending on other sensitive factors as well.  Most of 
these savings were found to come from reducing drug expenditures and decreased 
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radiological utilization.  Hillestad et al. (2005) conducted a study analyzing the potential 
benefits and costs in implementing an EMR system.  Their study involved estimating 
potential adoption costs, potential safety benefits, potential health benefits, and potential 
efficiency benefits.  The study found that as much as almost $371 billion can be saved in the 
hospital setting through the implementation of EMRs.  Many of the efficiency savings were 
also found to be due to reduced drug expenditures as well in this study.  Both of these studies 
though are limited in that they may not have accounted for every applicable cost and benefit.  
Hillestad et al. (2005) had a strong limitation in that all of the costs and benefits are proposed 
and based on a scaling from a local or state level to the national level.  Thus this study was 
limited by the fact that it only proposed potential benefits and costs of implementing an EMR 
system and did not find these benefits and costs empirically.   
 
2.2 EMR Implementation 
Multiple studies have been conducted to see how prevalent EMRs are throughout the 
US.  These studies all show that EMR implementation is very low in the US.  Jha et al. 
(2009) conducted their own survey to see how many hospitals that were part of the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) implemented EMRs.  They used a categorical breakdown of 
EMR functionalities to see the implementation rates of the various categories across the 
US.  They used three sets of EMR functionalities: basic, basic with clinical notes, and 
comprehensive.  In the end they found that although many hospitals use various EMR 
functionalities on their own, only 1.5% of hospitals surveyed used comprehensive EMR, 
while 7.6% used basic EMR with clinical notes, and 10.9% used basic EMR without clinical 
notes.   
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 The idea of designating different sets of EMR functionalities is not unique to Jha et 
al. (2009).  Geissler et al. (2010) used the same sets of EMR functionalities as Jha et al. 
(2009) and applied it to hospital emergency departments for the years 2005 and 2006 to see 
the levels of implementation. Geissler et al. (2010) used the National Hospital Ambulatory 
Care Survey (NHAMCS) for the years 2005 and 2006.  This survey asks questions to hospital 
emergency rooms about the presence of an EMR and various EMR functionalities.  They 
studied the rate of implementation of any EMR and then considered the three categories 
listed above.  Their findings were similar to Jha et al. (2009) in that less than 10% had 
comprehensive EMR systems and roughly 17% had a basic system.  Furukawa 2011 used 
similar categories of EMR functionalities as well to ascertain EMR usage.  He used the 
NHAMCS data for the year 2006 and found that only 10.8% had a basic EMR and only 1.7% 
had a fully functional EMR.  It is clear based on these three studies that EMR 
implementation is low regardless of the definition.  In my study, part of my analysis will 
involve seeing the usage of EMR systems over the time period between 2006 and 2009.  I 
will most likely be using the same the breakdown of EMR functionalities as in Furukawa 
(2011.) 
Many of the above studies on EMR implementation also found factors that influenced 
adoption of EMRs.  Jha et al. (2009) found that being a large institution, being a major 
teaching center, being part of a larger hospital system, being located in an urban area, and 
having a dedicated coronary care unit were all hospital characteristics that positively 
influenced EMR adoption.  Geissler et al. (2010) also found that being an urban region 
increased adoption of an EMR, and that the geographic region of the hospital affected EMR 
adoption, with the Northeast region having the highest EMR implementation.  That last 
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finding is interesting because Furukawa (2011) found that the Midwest region had the largest 
influence on EMR adoption.  In addition to this, he found that urban areas with higher 
median incomes and higher educational attainment led to higher levels of EMR adoption, 
while being government owned or for-profit tended to negatively affect EMR 
adoption.  These factors are all hospital factors that may have an influence on EMR 
adoption.  In my study I plan to use many of these same variables and in addition to them, 
include many patient and visit characteristics as well. 
 
2.3 Meaningful use of EMR 
The term "meaningful use" refers to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement with respect to 
EMR use.  Physicians and hospitals who employ EMR systems and are “meaningful users” 
of these systems will receive benefits from Medicare and Medicaid.  It is not clear in the 
legislation and thus it is unclear for healthcare providers as to what level their EMR 
implementation must be to gain these rewards.  Geisler et al. (2010) found that regardless of 
the definition of meaningful use used, US EDs were not implementing EMRs meaningfully.  
When they used “basic” as their definition of meaningful use, only 17% of US EDs were 
meaningful users of EMR, while if they chose to use a “comprehensive” definition, only 6% 
of US EDs qualified as meaningful users.  Furukawa (2011) used categories of basic and 
fully-functional in his study.  His findings show that a basic EMR is not sufficient to cause 
great changes in the ED, while a fully-functional EMR may be able to cause these changes.  
Thus it would seem that using EMRs that are highly sophisticated are good candidates for 
what legislation would call a “meaningful use” of EMR. 
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2.4 The Effects of EMR Implementation 
2.4.1 Effects on Quality of Health 
 Research on how EMR implementation affects quality of health has shown mostly 
that EMRs have little or no effect on the quality of health.  Linder et al. (2007) used the 
National Ambulatory Care Survey (NAMCS) for the years 2003 and 2004 to see if the 
presence of EMRs has an effect on 17 different quality indicators.  The study found that the 
presence of EMRs throughout the two year span only had a positive effect on two indicators, 
no effect on fourteen indicators, and actually a negative effect on one indicator.  Thus they 
concluded that there was no consistent effect on quality of health by EMR usage.  Romano 
and Stafford (2011) conducted a follow up study to Linder et al. (2007) and wanted to see 
how EMR paired with clinical decision support (CDS) affected quality of health indicators.  
CDS should in theory be a functionality of EMR that directly and positively affects quality of 
health.  They used the 2005-2007 NHAMCS data and compared the usage of EMR and CDS 
to any observed effects on 20 quality of health indicators.  This study like Linder et al. 2007 
found that EMR and CDS both had only a positively significant effect on one of the twenty 
indicators.  Thus EMR usage even with CDS does not have an effect on quality.  The two 
studies used indicators that involved whether physicians used correct treatments for varying 
conditions.  Thus their measures of quality of health depended on correct treatment protocols.  
These two studies are pertinent to my study as they both use NAMCS/NHAMCS data and 
they consider EMR usage, but as they have shown that EMR usage does not have a 
significant effect on healthcare quality, the focus of my study shifted away from EMR’s 
effect on quality of health.  
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2.4.2 Effects on Emergency Department Efficiency 
Furukawa (2011) used stratified categories to see if these levels of EMR 
functionalities actually had an impact of emergency room efficiency.  The measures of 
efficiency used were length of stay, wait time, treatment time, and occurrences of patients 
who left without treatment (LWOT).  He found that hospitals with fully functional EMRs had 
strong negative effects on length of stay, wait time, and treatment time, while basic EMRs 
did not have significant relationships with the majority of variables, nor were any 
relationships linear.  In essence, Furukawa showed that EMRs must be fully functional to 
have a “meaningful use” since basic EMRs did not have many significant effects.  His 
finding has implications on policy as financial incentives should be focused on hospitals 
implementing fully functional EMRs in the future.   
As shown by both Hillestad et al. (2005) and Furukawa (2011), EMR implementation 
can have significant impacts on hospital efficiency.  Similar to Furukawa’s study, I plan to 
analyze wait times, but I also plan to analyze readmission rates and the number of procedures 
and medications prescribed.  All of these factors are indicators of hospital efficiency and can 
be strongly affected by EMR implementation.  It is clear that not much research has been 
conducted on this topic yet and as such my study can contribute to the existing literature. 
 
3. METHODS 
3.1  Dataset 
 This study used the National Health Ambulatory Care Survey (NHAMCS) for the 
year 2009.  This survey is conducted annually by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).  The survey collects data on services provided in hospital emergency and 
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outpatient departments in noninstitutional general and short-stay hospitals.  The survey is 
separated into an emergency department component and an outpatient department 
component.  The emergency department component is the focus of this study.  The survey is 
a national (all fifty states and the District of Columbia) sample of hospitals and participation 
in the study for any hospital is completely optional.  The survey is administered by specially 
trained interviewers which ensure that hospitals are eligible and know what they are doing.  
The survey is conducted through a form called the Patient Record Form, which is completed 
over a four week period in each hospital.  Various information on patient and visit 
characteristics are included on this form.  The survey also uses a hospital induction interview 
form to gather information on hospital characteristics, including EMR usage.  Each 
observation in the survey defines one patient visit to the emergency department. In 2009, a 
total of 1,377 hospital emergency departments were surveyed and 140,415 emergency 
department patient visits were recorded.  These numbers were weighted to represent a 
national sample of 18,970 hospital EDs and 495,826,926 ED patient visits.  This estimation 
shows how widely used emergency departments are in this country and why an analysis on 
their efficiency is important. 
 
3.2 Use of Sampling Weights in the Analysis 
 The NHAMCS is a survey that intends to represent characteristics of emergency 
departments and outpatient departments on a national scale.  The original survey does not 
interview every single hospital in the nation and thus the data in the survey has to be scaled 
up to a national level.  In order to make the data nationally representative, the survey makes 
use of sampling weights.  Without the use of these weights, any analysis using the survey 
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data would produce biased results.  The NHAMCS uses two specific sampling weights in the 
emergency department record: the patient visit weight for patient and visit characteristics, 
and the emergency department weight for hospital characteristics.  These sampling weights 
help make the sample nationally representative, but more than just sampling weights is 
needed to use NHAMCS data accurately.  When the NHAMCS conducts their survey, there 
are levels to how they conduct the survey to hospitals.  First, the NHAMCS divides multiple 
geographic regions into strata.  Within each strata, more divisions occur and each of these 
regions are denoted primary sampling units (PSUs) or clusters.  Within each cluster, hospitals 
are used as the next level of analysis.  Then within each hospital, outpatient clinics or 
emergency service areas are chosen.  The final level to the NHAMCS analyzes patient visits 
within each outpatient clinic or emergency service area.  This entire sampling process is used 
to reduce standard errors and create nationally representative data.  This study used both 
types of sampling weights, the patient visit weight and the emergency department weight.  
The variables used in this study required the use of both kinds of weights.  The majority of 
the analysis was conducted at the patient level and thus patient visit weights were the main 
type of sampling weight used.  This study accounted for variances across clusters and strata 
using the related strata and cluster variables present in the NHAMCS (Pitblado 2012 and 
2009 NHAMCS micro-data file). 
 
3.3 EMR Sophistication 
 The important variable in this study was the presence of an EMR system.  The 
NHAMCS asks “Does your ED use electronic medical records (EMR) (not including billing 
records)?”  The survey also asks about the presence of an additional thirteen EMR 
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functionalities.  Nonresponse and responses to these survey questions resulting in “unknown” 
and “turned off” were coded as not having the EMR system or function.   
 The classification of EMR sophistication was based on the classification used by 
Furukawa (2011).  The three categories were minimal/no EMR, basic EMR, and fully 
functional EMR.  “Minimal/no EMR” referred to hospitals that either had no EMR system or 
had an EMR system with less than the minimum set of EMR functions (patient demographic 
information, laboratory results, computerized order for tests, imaging results, clinical notes, 
and computerized orders for prescriptions).  “Basic EMR” referred to hospitals with EMRs 
with at least the minimal set of EMR functions.  “Fully functional EMR” was assigned to 
hospital EDs with the minimum set of EMR functions plus an additional seven advanced 
functions.  These advanced functionalities included highlighting out of range levels, sending 
test orders electronically, having medical history and follow up notes, returning electronic 
images, warnings off drug interactions and contraindications provided, reminders for 
guideline-based interventions and/or screening tests, and prescriptions sent electronically to 
pharmacy (Furukawa 2011).  Implementation of EMRs and associated functionalities for the 
year 2009 is shown in Table 1. 
 
3.4 EMR Implementation in 2009 
 As shown in Table 1, EMR implementation was varied.  When looking at overall 
EDs, the percent implementation was 73.8%, which is much higher than the 46.2% 
implementation for all EDs that Furukawa (2011) determined in 2006.  Thus between 2006 
and 2009, EMR implementation increased to a large extent. The individual functionalities 
also followed this same trend over the time period.  Thus as more EMRs were adopted, EMR 
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became more sophisticated as well over this time period.  Larger percentages of EMRs had 
more functions per EMR, even the more advanced functions, which were less implemented 
in 2006 (Furukawa 2011).  Thus EMRs have become more widespread and also more 
sophisticated more recently.  This would hopefully cause greater improvements in efficiency 
similar to the effects Furukawa (2011) found. 
 
3.5 ED Efficiency 
 I used five measures of ED efficiency.  All of these measures related to ED 
overcrowding and patient throughput.  These measures included wait times, number of 
procedures given, number of medications prescribed, number of diagnostic tests given, and 
hours on ambulance diversion.  Wait times were measured in minutes from entering the ED 
until seeing the physician.  The variables for number of procedures, number of medications, 
and number of diagnostic tests were all measured as given in the NHAMCS and then each 
were divided by a measure for length of visit in the ED (measured in minutes).  Thus 
measures for these variables per unit time in the ED were determined.  Lastly, ambulance 
diversion was measured in total number of hours the ED spent on ambulance diversion for 
the year.  The NHAMCS uses an ordered variable for hours on ambulance diversion.  To 
create a continuous variable from this, I took the midpoint value for each ordered value and 
replaced all ordered labels with said midpoint value. Any responses with missing information 
for any of the above variables was excluded from the analysis.  Descriptive statistics for these 
five variables are present on the next page in Table 2. 
 Table 2 provides good insight into the overall measures I studied, but it does not 
indicate much in terms of comparison or with relation to EMR presence.  Thus I calculated 
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similar descriptive statistics for the five main variables, but across the EMR classification I 
used in this study.  These values are present below in Table 3.  Table 3 shows that for wait 
times, as EMR sophistication increased, so did the mean wait time.  For number of 
procedures, number of medications, and number of diagnostic tests, as EMR sophistication 
increased, these values decreased, which is promising.  Lastly ambulance diversion showed 
fluctuations, but showed a large reduction for fully functional EMR. 
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Table 1: Table showing the implementation of EMR and the various possible functionalities it 
can have.  Implementation is shown for all EDs as well as broken down across the three 
classification levels of EMR sophistication: Minimal/no EMR, Basic EMR, and Fully Functional 
EMR.  Estimates for average EMR functions used as each level as well as estimates for the 
population analyzed are also present. 
  EMR Sophistication 
 All EDs Minimal or No 
EMR 
Basic EMR Fully Functional 
EMR 
Emergency Department (ED) 
uses EMR system, % 
73.8 62.8 32.2 5.1 
  Functions included in EMR 
system,% 
    
    Minimus set of EMR 
functions 
    
      Patient Demographic 
Information 
96.7 83.1 100.0 100.0 
      Laboratory Results 88.7 69.8 100.0 100.0 
      Computerized orders for 
tests 
86.0 67.4 100.0 100.0 
      Imaging results 84.2 67.4 100.0 100.0 
      Clinical notes 68.2 32.9 100.0 100.0 
      Computerized orders for 
      prescriptions 
63.9 28.6 100.0 100.0 
    Advanced EMR functions     
      Out of range levels 
highlighted 
86.5 63.8 97.4 100.0 
      Test orders sent 
electronically 
80.1 63.1 91.9 100.0 
      Medical history and 
follow-up notes 
59.7 24.6 91.4 100.0 
      Electronic images 
returned 
77.8 60.6 96.9 100.0 
      Warnings of drug 
interactions and 
      contraindications 
provided 
49.3 17.6 74.6 100.0 
      Reminders for guideline-
based  
      interventions and/or 
screening tests 
35.3 13.6 42.1 100.0 
      Prescriptions sent 
electronically to  
      pharmacy 
24.5 9.7 21.5 100.0 
EMR functions used, # 8.02 6.02 11.16 13.0 
N (EDs) 337 166 135 36 
Population (EDs) 4680 2938 1505 237 
N (ED visits) 34,942 17,195 13,733 4,014 
Population (ED visits; 
million) 
136.1 67.0 53.5 15.6 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics table showing the number of observations, mean, and standard 
deviation for the main dependent variables of this study.  Variables for wait times and hours 
on ambulance diversion are broken down by patient acuity.  Estimates here are at the patient 
level for all variables except hours on ambulance diversion.  Ambulance diversion was 
analyzed at the emergency department level.  Appropriate sampling weights from the 2009 
NHAMCS were used to provide nationally representative data. 
2009 Number Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Wait time to see a physician (in 
min) 
   
  All patients 31038 58.1 78.7 
  Patient acuity level/triage    
    Immediate/emergent 3879 47.8 74.2 
    Urgent/semiurgent 23231 61.2 79.9 
    Nonurgent 3928 48.3 70.5 
Number of Procedures    
  All patients 32384 .39 0.85 
Number of Medications    
  All patients 33474 0.84 1.52 
Number of Diagnostic Tests    
  All Patients 33009 1.58 3.45 
Hours on Ambulance Diversion 
(in hours) 
   
  All patients 241 139.2 254.8 
  Patient acuity level/triage    
    Immediate/emergent 38 147.4 293.2 
    Urgent/semiurgent 168 145.8 254.0 
    Nonurgent 35 98.6 214.0 
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3.6 Patient and Visit Characteristics 
I included measures for patient characteristics including age, sex, race, ethnicity, 
expected source of payment, and the patient’s residence into the models used in this 
paper.  I also controlled for multiple visit related characteristics.  These included patient 
acuity level/triage and the presence or specific chronic conditions.  Descriptive statistics 
for these variables are present below in Table 4.   
	   Number Mean Standard Deviation 
Wait times (in minutes) 	   	   	  
Minimal/No EMR 17176 53.8 74.1 
Basic 13716 61.6 81.7 
Fully Functional 4010 67.8 89.4 
Number of Procedures 	   	   	  
Minimal/No EMR 16051 0.42 0.90 
Basic 12655 0.36 0.81 
Fully Functional 3678 0.33 0.72 
Number of Medications 	   	   	  
Minimal/No EMR 16438 0.89 1.55 
Basic 13134 0.81 1.38 
Fully Functional 3902 0.67 2.03 
Number of Diagnostic Tests 	   	   	  
Minimal/No EMR 16299 1.64 3.00 
Basic 12932 1.53 3.97 
Fully Functional 3778 1.44 3.74 
Hours on Ambulance Diversion 
(in hours) 
	   	   	  
Minimal/No EMR 122 137.7 258.0 
Basic 98 152.0 265.8 
Fully Functional 21 88.1 173.9 
 
Table 3: Table of descriptive statistics including number of observations, mean and standard 
deviation of the five dependent variables, stratified by EMR classification.  All estimates are at 
the patient level except hours on ambulance diversion.  Ambulance diversion was analyzed at the 
emergency department level.  Appropriate sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used 
to provide nationally representative data. 
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Table 4: Table of descriptive statistics for controls related to the patient and the 
patient visit.  All estimates are weighted using sampling weights from the 2009 
NHAMCS to make the results nationally representative. 
 
 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 36.3 24.1 
Male 0.45 0.5 
Female 0.55 0.5 
Patient Residence     
Private Residence 0.91 0.29 
Nursing Home 0.02 0.14 
Homeless 0.004 0.068 
Other residence 0.01 0.1 
Ethnicity/Race     
Hispanic/Latino 0.14 0.35 
White 0.68 0.47 
Black 0.23 0.42 
Asian 0.02 0.14 
Pacific Islander 0.007 0.081 
American Indian 0.007 0.086 
More than one race 0.006 0.08 
Payment Method     
Private Insurance 0.39 0.49 
Medicare 0.17 0.38 
Medicaid 0.3 0.46 
Worker’s Compensation 0.01 0.11 
Self-pay 0.18 0.38 
No charge 0.01 0.12 
Payment Method Unknown 0.04 0.19 
Patient Acuity     
Immediate/Emergent 0.12 0.32 
Urgent/Semi-urgent 0.77 0.42 
Nonurgent 0.11 0.31 
Chronic Condition     
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.02 0.16 
Congestive Heart Failure 0.03 0.17 
Condition Requiring Dialysis 0.008 0.091 
HIV 0.006 0.074 
Diabetes 0.08 0.27 
No Chronic Condition 0.8 0.4 
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Table 5: Table of descriptive statistics for controls related to the hospital ED and the area 
the hospital is located in.  All estimates are weighted using sampling weights from the 
2009 NHAMCS to make the results nationally representative. 
 
 
 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Teaching Hospital Status 0.1 0.3 
MSA 0.82 0.39 
Region     
Northeast 0.18 0.39 
Midwest 0.25 0.43 
South 0.39 0.49 
West 0.18 0.38 
Hospital Ownership     
Voluntary/non-profit 0.76 0.43 
Government/non-federal 0.14 0.34 
Proprietary Ownership 0.11 0.31 
Percent Poverty     
Less than 5.00 percent 0.13 0.34 
5.00-9.99 percent 0.24 0.43 
10.00-19.99 percent 0.35 0.48 
20..00 percent or more 0.22 0.42 
Median Household Income     
$32,793 or less 0.3 0.46 
$32,794-$40,626 0.25 0.43 
$40,627-$52,387 0.21 0.41 
$52,388 or more 0.18 0.38 
Percent with Bachelor’s Degree     
Less than 12.84 percent 0.33 0.46 
12.84-19.66 percent 0.24 0.43 
19.67-31.68 percent 0.21 0.4 
31.69 percent or more 0.17 0.38 
Urban-Rural Classification     
Large central metro 0.29 0.45 
Large fringe metro 0.19 0.39 
Medium metro 0.23 0.42 
Small metro 0.07 0.26 
Non-metro (micropolitan and non-core) 0.19 0.39 
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As can be seen in Table 4, most patients are white, pay by private insurance, are 
approaching middle age, and do not have chronic conditions. 
 
3.7 Hospital and Area Characteristics 
 Several hospital characteristics were used to control for EMR usage.  These 
characteristics include hospital ownership, teaching status, hospital region.  Teaching 
status was inferred based on whether patients were seen by a resident or an intern.  
Hospital region is a geographic classification of where the hospital is located.  Hospital 
ownership was classified as voluntary, non-federal governmental, and proprietary. 
 There were also some area characteristics based on the patient’s zip code of 
residence.  These included the percent of poverty, median household income, the percent 
of adults with at least a college education, and the urban/rural classification of the 
patient’s zip code.  Descriptive statistics on hospital and area characteristics are present 
on the previous page in Table 5.  Table 5 shows that most hospitals are located in a 
metropolitan area, and are voluntary/non-profit hospitals.   
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Regression Models and Analysis 
 I performed five survey weighted survey-weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, one for each of the five ED efficiency variables.  The variables for wait times 
and hours on ambulance diversion were log transformed prior to regression analysis.  
There were instrumental variable (IV) regressions as well for each of these five OLS 
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regressions.  Wait times and ambulance diversion were also broken down within the 
regression models based on patient acuity levels. 
 In addition to these models, I used an additional model where the EMR 
classifications for basic and full were combined into one variable.  I performed OLS and 
IV regressions for all five ED efficiency variables within this additional model as well.  I 
estimated multiple regressions, all of which are summarized in Table 6 below.  Table 6 
only contains IV estimations; OLS estimations are present in the Appendix along with 
patient, visit, hospital, and area characteristic effects. 
 
4.2 Tests for Endogeneity and Reverse Causality 
 There was concern that the implementation of EMR is endogenous.  In particular, 
it is possible that more efficient hospitals would be quicker to implement more 
sophisticated EMR systems.  Although various hospital characteristics are controlled for 
in this study, omitted hospital characteristics may be correlated with both EMR 
sophistication and ED efficiency, which would bias the results.  Another possibility 
where endogeneity could arise is that less efficiency hospitals may adopt EMRs more 
readily to hopefully improve their efficiency.  Instrumental variables (IV) were used to 
account for possible endogeneity.  For IVs two dummy variables were used that are also 
part of the NHAMCS: one that indicated if EMRs had public health reporting and another 
that indicated if EMRs could send notifiable diseases electronically.  These IVs were 
chosen because public health agencies have varied IT usage and sophistication, variation 
that existed across states. Since a possible source of endogeneity are EMRs that are 
implemented in response to efficiency needs or sustenance.  EMRs that would have 
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public health reporting and notifiable disease reporting would most likely have these two 
functionalities as a response to public health needs or possible state or local government 
programs to improve public health.  Thus these functionalities would exist in EMRs that 
were implemented not for any efficiency related reasons.  Although information on 
public health and disease notification may have some effects on administrative processes 
in the ED setting, it was believed that these IVs were only correlated with EMR 
sophistication and not with ED efficiency and the clinical care processes involved within 
the ED (Furukawa 2011).   
 
4.2.1 Results of Endogeneity and Reverse Causality Tests 
 Three tests were conducted to test the validity and use of the instrument variables.  
These tests produced varying results depending on the ultimate dependent variable used 
and the model used.  The three tests used were an underidentification test, an 
overidentifying restrictions test, and endogeneity tests for the EMR regressors.  When 
considering wait times, it appears that the IVs are not relevant as the underidentification 
test was not rejected in the model where basic and full are separate variables.  In the 
model where basic and full are combined, the IVs are relevant and the underidentification 
test was rejected.  The endogeneity tests for the basic and full EMR variables showed that 
the basic variable is exogenous (P=.0568), while the full variable is endogenous 
(P=.0058).  The combined model for EMR shows that the combined EMR variable is also 
exogenous.  Lastly an overidentifying restrictions test was performed for the combined 
model and the null hypothesis was rejected (P=.0375), meaning that the instruments are 
not strong or valid.   
 
 
26 
 These tests were also conducted for the other dependent variables from the study.  
For number of procedures, in the model with two EMR regressors, the IVs were again not 
relevant.  Basic was found to be endogenous (P=.0178), but full was determined to be 
exogenous (P=.286).  The combined model was found to have relevant IVs, although not 
completely exogenous IVs (Hansen test P<.05).  Additionally, the combined EMR 
variable was found to be exogenous as well (P=.2449).   
 For number of medications, the separated EMR model showed again that the IVs 
were not related to the EMR variables.  Basic was found to be exogenous (P=.616) and 
full was determined to also be exogenous (P=.3352).  In the combined model, the IVs 
were relevant, but weakly identifying (P=.1248 for test of overidentifying restrictions).  
Lastly, the combined EMR variable was found to be exogenous as well (P=.3864).   
 When considering number of diagnostic tests, the separated EMR model shows 
underidentification in terms of relevance again.  Basic was found to be endogenous in 
this case (P=.0014) and full was determined to be exogenous (P=.2710).  Lastly the 
combined model showed that the instruments were relevant and valid.  Also the 
combined EMR model was very endogenous (P=0.00).   
 Lastly, with respect to ambulance diversion, both basic and full were 
underidentified and thus not related strongly to the IVs used.   
 As can be seen there is variation with respect to endogeneity of the EMR 
regressors as well as how valid and strong the IVs are.  Overall, though it would appear 
that the use of instrumental variables is necessary and was done as such to create 
consistency across all models and variables.  Additionally the results do not differ 
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significantly if only the OLS model were used and thus instrumental variables were the 
better choice as they account for possible endogeneity.   
 
4.3 The Effect of EMR sophistication on Wait Times 
As shown in Table 6, the presence and sophistication of EMR does not have any 
significant effects on wait times.  Both in the model where basic and full are analyzed 
separately as well as where they are combined, wait time is unaffected by EMR presence 
and sophistication.  Although EMRs do not have an effect on wait times, many of the 
patient and visit characteristics included in the regression do have significant 
relationships with wait times (see Appendix).  Patients who lived in a nursing home saw 
significantly less wait times than patients who lived in other residences.  There was also 
some indication of gender bias with wait times analyzed since men have shorter wait 
times than women.  Many of the racial groups also saw shorter wait times than patients 
with multiple races. Most of the variables for chronic conditions were significantly 
related to wait times, but not all the same way.  Congestive heart failure, HIV, and 
diabetes all increase wait times for patients.  This is possibly due to their chronic 
condition meaning they are not in need of immediate acute care, but just routine care 
mostly and thus the hospital may rationalize them to wait longer or possibly they 
themselves are more comfortable with the longer wait (Grumbach et al. 1993).  The 
exception to this though are patients requiring dialysis.  These patients see significantly 
shorter wait times.  Dialysis may occur more often and require more immediate treatment 
than the other chronic conditions and thus these patients may wait less (Friedman et al. 
2000). 
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Within the hospital and area characteristics, the most interesting finding was that 
voluntary as well as governmental/non-federal hospitals both lead to longer wait times.  
This is an interesting finding since the majority of hospitals in this country are non-profit 
hospitals, either voluntary or state or local governmental ones (Bays 1983).  Thus the 
majority of hospitals in this country seem to lead to longer wait times, at least when 
compared to proprietary owned hospitals.  Although hospitals are seemingly seeing 
increased wait times, EMRs do not seem to be the solution to this issue. 
 
4.4 The Effect of EMR Sophistication on the Number of Procedures Over Time 
 Similar to wait times, EMR sophistication was shown to have no effect on the 
number of procedures given in an ED, as shown in Table 6.  Thus EMRs do not improve 
efficiency in this area either.  There were some interesting patient and visit characteristics 
that did correlate with the number of procedures given (see Appendix).  Age correlated 
strongly and positively with the number of procedures given in a certain time, which is 
reasonable.  Older patients tend to be less healthy and require more care.  Since they 
require more care and get sick more often, they would logically require more procedures 
to be performed (Yang et al. 2003).  Again, patients living in a nursing home correlated 
strongly with this measure in that nursing home patients received more procedures than 
other patients.  Nursing home patients are usually elderly patients who require more care 
than other patients and thus would need more procedures (Yang et al. 2003).  Other 
interesting relationships are that males receive more procedures than females.  It is 
possible that either men get sick more often, or that they seek care more often than 
females do.  Hispanic patients interestingly receive significantly less timely care than 
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patients of multiple races.  This may be an issue of access to care (Ku and Matani 2001).  
Patients who chose to pay through their private insurance plans or by worker’s 
compensation saw increased number of procedures.  This may be due to the fact that 
these plans are not capitated on their reimbursement and healthcare providers may abuse 
the system (Hashimoto 1996).  It is also possible that patients with these plans seek care 
more often since they feel they will be covered regardless: a form of moral hazard in a 
way.  Interestingly, the chronic conditions were not significantly related to the number of 
procedures given.  This is interesting since chronic patients tend to use more healthcare 
than other patients (Grumbach et al. 1993).  It is possible that the procedures that the 
NHAMCS categorize as “procedures” are not the kinds of procedures these chronic 
conditions require regularly. 
 None of the hospital or area characteristics showed significant relationships with 
the number of procedures performed. 
 
4.5 The Effect of EMR Sophistication on the Number of Medications Over Time 
 Table 6 once again shows that EMR sophistication does not have any effect on the 
number of medications prescribed.  Although EMR sophistication and implementation do 
not affect the number of medications given, there are some controls that do.  Age is 
shown here again to be significantly correlated.  Older patients as aforementioned tend to 
be sicker and require more care and this may also lead to increased number of 
medications in a given time to provide this increased care (Yang et al. 2002).  In some 
models, patients who did not have to pay saw increased medication orders.  This may be 
a result of the patient or the physician abusing the insurance system, similar to a moral 
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hazard problem.  Congestive heart failure (CHF) also showed higher number of 
medications in a given time.  Out of the multiple chronic conditions included in the 
NHAMCS, CHF may require the most amount of medicine given in a timely manner.   
 With respect to the hospital and area characteristics, only urban-rural 
classification showed significance.  Areas with a large fringe metro classification or a 
medium metro classification lead to more medications given.  Thus hospitals in these 
areas have communities that may require more medicine than other areas.  This could 
also be due to patients who have specific medical conditions in these areas that require 
more medication. 
 
4.6 The Effect of EMR Sophistication on the Number of Diagnostic Tests Over Time 
  As shown in Table 6, the number of diagnostic tests does not change with EMR 
sophistication or even if EMR is merely present.  There were some other key variables 
that showed significant relationships with diagnostic testing.  Within the patient and visit 
characteristics, age was very significant.  This relationship is most likely related to the 
reasoning for why older patients also receive more procedures mentioned above (Yang et 
al. 2002).  Also when looking at the chronic conditions.  Many of these conditions 
significantly increased the number of diagnostic tests.  This is logical as chronic 
conditions require more diagnostic testing regularly such as blood tests and imaging 
(Grumbach et al. 1993).  The chronic conditions that were found to be significant were 
cerebrovascular disease, congestive heart failure, and diabetes.  HIV and dialysis patients 
did not show significant relationships.  The significance of some of these chronic 
conditions also may indicate why age is highly significant in this model.  Certain 
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payment methods were also significant such as worker’s compensation and patients who 
did not have to pay.  This is most likely related to a similar reasoning mentioned above  
 
Table 6: Table summarizes results from multiple regressions using Instrumental Variable 
(IV) models for the five dependent variables analyzed.  Wait times is stratified by patient 
acuity levels.  All estimates are nationally representative.  Sampling weights from the 
2009 NHAMCS were used to determine these estimates.  Standard errors are present in 
parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  OLS regressions were also conducted with these 
dependent variables.  Additionally multiple patient, visit, hospital, and area 
characteristics were regressed on these variables within these IV models as well as OLS 
models.  The regression results for these other variables as well as complete OLS 
regression results are present in the appendix. 
 
 Basic EMR Fully Functional 
EMR 
Basic or Fully 
Functional EMR 
Wait time    
  All patients 0.294 
(0.647) 
 
-0.0764 
(0.565) 
 
0.0895 
(0.501) 
 
  Patient Acuity/Triage    
    Immediate/emergent -0.708 
(0.758) 
 
0.261 
(0.840) 
 
-0.230 
(0.556) 
 
    Urgent/semiurgent 0.419 
(0.805) 
 
-0.312 
(0.594) 
 
-0.0188 
(0.500) 
 
    Nonurgent 0.991 
(0.738) 
 
1.823 
(1.401) 
 
0.717 
(0.593) 
 
Number of Procedures    
  All patients 0.259 
(0.409) 
 
-0.0345 
(0.223) 
 
0.0899 
(0.272) 
 
Number of Medications    
  All patients 0.0676 
(0.488) 
 
-0.306 
(0.429) 
 
-0.139 
(0.414) 
 
Number of Diagnostic Tests    
  All patients 1.492 
(1.073) 
 
0.879 
(0.950) 
 
1.145 
(0.750) 
 
Hours on Ambulance Diversion    
  All patients -5.734 
(5.228) 
 
-4.658 
(5.154) 
 
-5.200 
(3.144) 
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for why worker’s compensation and private insurance increased the number of 
procedures (Hashimoto 1996).  These payment methods do not restrict the amount of care 
used and both the patient and the physician may take advantage of this fact. 
 With respect to hospital and area characteristics, hospitals with government/non-
federal ownership significantly reduce the amount of diagnostic tests given.  This may be 
due to a more price rationing ideology at these hospitals.  Thus these hospitals are more 
conservative with their expenditures.  With respect to efficiency, these hospitals are 
seemingly less efficient since they aim to reduce the number of diagnostic tests within a 
given time. 
 
4.7 The Effect of EMR Sophistication on Ambulance Diversion Hours 
 Table 6 shows that EMR sophistication and implementation does not affect the 
number of hours a hospital goes on ambulance diversion.  Unfortunately it also seems 
that none of the patient, visit, hospital, or area characteristics correlate with ambulance 
diversion either.  Ambulance diversion may not be something that is caused by anything 
other than chance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 Although EMR was being more widely implemented in 2009, the potential 
efficiency effects of EMR sophistication and implementation discussed earlier in this 
paper were not found.  Overall the presence and sophistication of an EMR system does 
not improve emergency department efficiency.  Thus the reasoning behind the 
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implementation of an EMR system in a hospital ED should not be based on efficiency 
goals.   
 Although EMRs are not related to efficiency variables, many patient and visit 
characteristics were.  Some of these characteristics included gender, age, payment 
method, and chronic conditions.  Certain hospital and area characteristics such as hospital 
ownership and urban-rural classification were also related to some of the efficiency 
variables, but less so than patient and visit characteristics.   
 Thus going forward, hospital emergency departments may want to focus on these 
patient and visit characteristics to improve efficiency as EMRs as they exist now are not 
leading to efficiency improvements.   
 
5.2 Relationship to Existing Literature 
 This paper showed that EMR sophistication and presence does not improve 
hospital ED efficiency.  This finding contrasts the findings of Furukawa (2011).  He 
found that EMR sophistication can actually reduce length of stay and treatment time 
when using 2006 NHAMCS data.  My study’s results are somewhat opposing to his 
findings, but the reason for this may be due to a couple differences in the two studies.  
Firstly, the only variable in common between the two studies is wait times, and Furukawa 
did not find that EMR sophistication improved wait times either.  In fact he found that 
basic EMR significantly increased wait times (Furukawa 2011).  Additionally, I used 
2009 data whereas his study focused on 2006 data.  It is likely that EMRs were in an 
earlier stage of implementation in 2006 and I originally hypothesized that as EMR 
implementation and sophistication increased over time, by 2009 EMRs should have had 
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an even greater effect on ED efficiency.  As can be seen this was not the case.  The 
reasoning behind a lack of relationship between EMR sophistication and ED efficiency in 
2009 may be related to a maximization effect.  By 2009, EMRs were more implemented 
and it is possible that there was a maximum efficiency improvement that could be 
attained through the use and implementation of EMR systems.  Between 2006 and 2009, 
possibly this maximum was reached and thus this paper was not able to find any 
significant relationships between EMRs and emergency department efficiency.   
 This paper thus shows more of an inconclusive nature around the possible 
relationship between EMR sophistication and hospital ED efficiency.  In the future, 
hospitals may want to use EMRs for other purposes such as improving the cost 
effectiveness of their operations and reducing medical errors and in addition to finding 
other uses for EMRs, hospitals may also want to find other mechanisms for improving 
ED efficiency.  
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
 There were a number of limitations to this study.  Firstly, a major limitation to 
this study regards EMRs themselves.  There are multiple EMRs made by various 
companies currently.  The main issue with EMRs is their lack of interoperability.  EMRs 
are extensive within the hospital or physician practice they are implemented within, but 
patient information in one EMR does not transfer to another EMR in another hospital or 
practice, unless that medical practice or hospital is part of the same health system.  Thus 
the coordination of care and potential benefits of EMR only extend as far as the 
institution in which they exist.  Thus an analysis on if EMRs can improve hospital ED 
 
 
35 
efficiency does not look at the potential effect of a system that transfers and 
communicates health information across hospitals.  Possible solutions to this limitation 
are to analyze the Veterans Affairs system that uses an integrative EHR (Kizer and 
Dudley 2009), or to wait until the US begins to implement widespread EHRs and then 
conduct a similar study to the one conducted in this paper. 
 Another major limitation in this paper is related to endogeneity issues.  This paper 
addressed the possible endogeneity that exists between EMR sophistication and ED 
efficiency using an instrumental variable analysis.  After conducting multiple tests on the 
endogeneity of the EMR variables and the strength of the IVs, it became clear that the 
IVs used were not good instruments.  Thus the major limitation here was the lack of good 
instruments and thus the lack of a good way to address possible endogeneity issues.  
Instruments are not necessarily easy to find for a study, but if it is possible to find better 
ones for this specific research context, then those instruments should be used for future 
studies. 
 Another limitation was the lack of panel data for this topic.  The dataset used was 
the NHAMCS and the NHAMCS is an optional, anonymous survey conducted across the 
country every year.  Panel data would allow more analyses in this study.  Thus one could 
also look into the changes in ED efficiency over a time period as a result of changes in 
EMR sophistication over time.  This kind of study may be more revealing than the 
observational one done here. 
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5.4 Future Research 
 Several future research studies could be done to improve on the work done in this 
study.  One such study would be to focus on the Veteran’s Affairs (VA)  VistA EHR 
system as it is an integrative healthcare system and overcomes issues of interoperability.  
The VA hospital system implemented EMRs much earlier than other hospitals and thus 
their EMRs may have substantial effects on efficiency in their hospitals.  Now the VA 
system uses VistA, an integrative EHR system that began to be implemented in 1997.  It 
had improved quality of care and operational performance greatly since its 
implementation and now the VA healthcare system is the largest integrated health system 
in the country (Kizer and Dudley 2009).  Analyzing this system and seeing if the VA 
EHR contributes to higher levels of efficiency in VA hospital EDs could be a potential 
future study that would add to the current literature on EMRs/EHRs and hospital ED 
efficiency.  Additionally, one could look at hospitals that are similar to one another, but 
where some hospitals use integrative EMRs or EHRs, while others do not and see if there 
is a significant difference.  One could also study how the difference between integrative 
EMRs or EHRs and traditional non-integrative EMRs affects other factors such as cost 
effectiveness and medical errors. 
 Another possible future study would be more of an experimental study.  One 
could implement an EMR system that utilizes a context based viewing system.  This 
would involve an EMR system where data and information is stored in such a way that 
the way it is viewed changes depending on what kind of healthcare personnel is viewing 
the information.  Thus the information would appear differently depending on if 
pharmacists, physicians, or nurses would be the ones viewing the information.  The 
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overall information is the same, but it changes so as to make the most sense to whoever is 
viewing the information (Reddy et al.2009).  One could implement such a system and see 
if this context based system improves ED efficiency over traditional EMR systems. 
 Lastly, a future research study could be conducted in which EMRs are analyzed 
within the physician office setting.  Since physician offices provide longer term care and 
develop relationships with their patients, EMRs would act more like a patient information 
storage system and could help improve overall efficiency in the physician practice.  To 
conduct such a study, one could use similar variables as in this study, but instead of using 
the NHAMCS, use the National Ambulatory Care Survey (NAMCS), which looks at 
physician offices. 
 
 Electronic medical records seemingly do not aid in improving hospital emergency 
department efficiency.  Thus they may not be the solution to the overcrowding problem 
occurring in hospital EDs today.  EMRs, however, can possibly help in other ways such 
as reducing overall medical costs and preventing medical errors.  Hospital 
administrations should look for other methods by which to curb the growing issue of 
overcrowding in their EDs.  Although EMRs may not help with the issue, they 
nonetheless should be considered for other uses by the hospital. 
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7. APPENDIX 
Table 7: First stage regression results for the patient level variables. Three first stage 
regressions are shown below, one for each EMR regressors used in any of the models 
analyzed in this paper.  Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to make 
the estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in parentheses.  P-
values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
F-Stat   2.28   0.87 4.15 
VARIABLES basic full basic_or_full 
    
epubhthe 0.150* 0.0341 0.184** 
 (0.0861) (0.0458) (0.0879) 
enotdise -0.172 0.113* -0.0591 
 (0.108) (0.0613) (0.102) 
age -0.000961* 0.000489* -0.000472 
 (0.000506) (0.000270) (0.000524) 
privres -0.127 -0.0842 -0.211*** 
 (0.0814) (0.0522) (0.0697) 
nurshome -0.0957 -0.0986* -0.194** 
 (0.0881) (0.0542) (0.0791) 
homeless -0.133 -0.125 -0.258** 
 (0.108) (0.0781) (0.0995) 
male -0.00526 -0.00884* -0.0141** 
 (0.00711) (0.00490) (0.00709) 
ethun 0.0200 -0.0229 -0.00295 
 (0.0499) (0.0255) (0.0488) 
white 0.0169 -0.0626 -0.0457 
 (0.0818) (0.0649) (0.0721) 
black 0.0298 -0.0607 -0.0309 
 (0.0866) (0.0668) (0.0755) 
asian -0.0720 -0.0260 -0.0980 
 (0.0861) (0.0619) (0.0871) 
pacisland 0.120 -0.109 0.0115 
 (0.146) (0.0856) (0.134) 
amerind -0.160 -0.0611 -0.221* 
 (0.111) (0.0884) (0.126) 
paypriv -0.00304 -0.0367 -0.0397 
 (0.0377) (0.0237) (0.0380) 
paymcare -0.00862 -0.0256 -0.0342 
 (0.0278) (0.0215) (0.0270) 
paymcaid -0.0310 -0.0273 -0.0584 
 (0.0407) (0.0240) (0.0392) 
paywkcmp -0.0327 -0.0120 -0.0448 
 (0.0440) (0.0314) (0.0450) 
payself -0.0877* -0.0246 -0.112** 
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 (0.0529) (0.0366) (0.0564) 
paynochg -0.0899 0.0630 -0.0269 
 (0.101) (0.0814) (0.112) 
payoth 0.0552 -0.0264 0.0288 
 (0.0727) (0.0317) (0.0710) 
immediate -0.00883 0.0487** 0.0398 
 (0.0632) (0.0211) (0.0687) 
urgent -0.0467 0.0318 -0.0149 
 (0.0474) (0.0192) (0.0520) 
cebvd -0.0348 0.00921 -0.0256 
 (0.0494) (0.0474) (0.0505) 
chf 0.0580* -0.0178 0.0402 
 (0.0322) (0.0172) (0.0309) 
eddial 0.0409 0.00969 0.0506 
 (0.0439) (0.0307) (0.0455) 
edhiv -0.0458 0.0493 0.00358 
 (0.0600) (0.0407) (0.0618) 
diabetes 0.00968 -0.00182 0.00786 
 (0.0185) (0.0144) (0.0205) 
resint 0.0135 -0.00816 0.00529 
 (0.0738) (0.0426) (0.0653) 
msa 0.185** 0.0947** 0.280*** 
 (0.0754) (0.0459) (0.0830) 
northeast 0.0872 -0.0205 0.0667 
 (0.112) (0.0877) (0.129) 
midwest 0.00121 -0.00985 -0.00864 
 (0.0959) (0.0912) (0.118) 
south 0.0514 -0.0537 -0.00228 
 (0.0860) (0.0836) (0.101) 
voluntary 0.0305 0.00162 0.0321 
 (0.0940) (0.0586) (0.101) 
govnonfed -0.0288 0.0424 0.0136 
 (0.127) (0.0711) (0.127) 
pov2 -0.0186 -0.0442* -0.0628 
 (0.0327) (0.0255) (0.0396) 
pov3 -0.0223 -0.0119 -0.0343 
 (0.0488) (0.0299) (0.0537) 
pov4 -0.0661 0.0218 -0.0443 
 (0.0632) (0.0463) (0.0658) 
income2 -0.0907** 0.0341 -0.0566 
 (0.0411) (0.0331) (0.0450) 
income3 -0.0250 0.0352 0.0103 
 (0.0595) (0.0489) (0.0637) 
income4 -0.106 0.0202 -0.0859 
 (0.0740) (0.0563) (0.0743) 
degree2 0.0714* -0.0116 0.0597 
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 (0.0363) (0.0187) (0.0363) 
degree3 0.0669 -0.0336 0.0333 
 (0.0465) (0.0302) (0.0504) 
degree4 0.00120 -0.0303 -0.0291 
 (0.0569) (0.0428) (0.0590) 
urbanrur1 0.0818 -0.0237 0.0581 
 (0.0780) (0.0640) (0.0703) 
urbanrur2 -0.0885 -0.00886 -0.0974 
 (0.0853) (0.0633) (0.0808) 
urbanrur3 -0.0397 0.0471 0.00740 
 (0.0665) (0.0564) (0.0687) 
urbanrur4 -0.0137 -0.117*** -0.131 
 (0.0798) (0.0440) (0.0844) 
Constant 0.386** 0.154 0.540*** 
 (0.186) (0.162) (0.181) 
    
Observations 30,359 30,359 30,359 
R-squared 0.078 0.093 0.123 
 
 
Table 8: First stage regression results for the ED level variables. Three first stage 
regressions are shown below, one for each EMR regressors used in any of the models 
analyzed in this paper.  Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to make 
the estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in parentheses.  P-
values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES basic full basic_or_full 
    
epubhthe 0.185* 0.0216 0.207** 
 (0.0941) (0.0426) (0.103) 
enotdise -0.163* 0.0973** -0.0652 
 (0.0914) (0.0470) (0.111) 
age -0.00458** 0.00114 -0.00345 
 (0.00205) (0.000806) (0.00215) 
privres 0.0855 -0.107 -0.0217 
 (0.162) (0.0867) (0.173) 
nurshome -0.0559 -0.185* -0.241 
 (0.207) (0.103) (0.229) 
homeless -0.406 0.504** 0.0981 
 (0.257) (0.238) (0.358) 
male 0.223*** -0.0541* 0.169*** 
 (0.0611) (0.0310) (0.0582) 
ethun -0.120 -0.00187 -0.122 
 (0.128) (0.0361) (0.127) 
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white -0.0600 0.0167 -0.0433 
 (0.147) (0.0586) (0.141) 
black -0.0664 -0.00697 -0.0734 
 (0.161) (0.0619) (0.159) 
asian -0.139 0.0219 -0.117 
 (0.276) (0.0741) (0.260) 
pacisland -0.750*** 0.0349 -0.715*** 
 (0.208) (0.115) (0.237) 
paypriv -0.174* -0.00861 -0.183* 
 (0.0905) (0.0432) (0.103) 
paymcare 0.0813 -0.0498 0.0315 
 (0.125) (0.0459) (0.121) 
paymcaid -0.278*** 0.0380 -0.240** 
 (0.0950) (0.0379) (0.111) 
paywkcmp -0.275 -0.0535 -0.329 
 (0.249) (0.0539) (0.251) 
payself -0.332*** 0.0138 -0.318** 
 (0.114) (0.0498) (0.139) 
paynochg 0.0201 -0.0603 -0.0402 
 (0.223) (0.0573) (0.229) 
payoth 0.413** -0.0291 0.384* 
 (0.186) (0.0495) (0.197) 
immediate -0.0883 0.0497 -0.0387 
 (0.131) (0.0388) (0.138) 
urgent -0.000367 0.0462 0.0458 
 (0.0983) (0.0367) (0.104) 
cebvd -0.610*** 0.0375 -0.573*** 
 (0.186) (0.0857) (0.196) 
chf 0.0558 0.0505 0.106 
 (0.102) (0.0638) (0.103) 
eddial -0.246 -0.156 -0.402 
 (0.347) (0.139) (0.372) 
edhiv 0.472* -0.124 0.348 
 (0.248) (0.0818) (0.257) 
diabetes 0.214 -0.0287 0.186 
 (0.136) (0.0507) (0.148) 
resint 0.0358 0.0194 0.0551 
 (0.125) (0.0585) (0.123) 
msa 0.307** 0.0547* 0.362*** 
 (0.124) (0.0281) (0.120) 
northeast -0.0283 0.0359 0.00755 
 (0.127) (0.0546) (0.130) 
midwest -0.0837 0.0268 -0.0568 
 (0.121) (0.0582) (0.127) 
south -0.0969 0.00649 -0.0904 
 (0.109) (0.0505) (0.113) 
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voluntary 0.00896 -0.0415 -0.0325 
 (0.111) (0.0464) (0.110) 
govnonfed 0.0271 -0.0644 -0.0373 
 (0.140) (0.0522) (0.131) 
pov2 0.249** -0.0569 0.192 
 (0.104) (0.0646) (0.127) 
pov3 0.205* -0.0261 0.179 
 (0.119) (0.0496) (0.143) 
pov4 0.201 0.0116 0.213 
 (0.186) (0.0645) (0.190) 
income2 -0.116 -0.0183 -0.135 
 (0.0934) (0.0593) (0.0972) 
income3 -0.102 0.0239 -0.0780 
 (0.127) (0.0806) (0.131) 
income4 -0.0199 -0.0363 -0.0563 
 (0.183) (0.0831) (0.180) 
degree2 0.0134 -0.00572 0.00772 
 (0.0815) (0.0385) (0.0883) 
degree3 0.0455 -0.0432 0.00228 
 (0.118) (0.0342) (0.127) 
degree4 -0.00307 -0.0525 -0.0555 
 (0.137) (0.0418) (0.144) 
urbanrur1 -0.0818 0.0114 -0.0704 
 (0.148) (0.0555) (0.138) 
urbanrur2 -0.201 0.0248 -0.176 
 (0.127) (0.0606) (0.123) 
urbanrur3 -0.124 0.0355 -0.0884 
 (0.128) (0.0580) (0.137) 
urbanrur4 -0.210 -0.0656 -0.276* 
 (0.150) (0.0485) (0.152) 
Constant 0.397 0.0856 0.482 
 (0.331) (0.137) (0.377) 
    
Observations 292 292 292 
R-squared 0.297 0.149 0.294 
 
 
Table 9: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto wait times.  This table 
shows two OLS models and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS 
were used to make the estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in 
parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Wait Time (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  0.0925  0.0895 
  (0.0820)  (0.501) 
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basic 0.0632  0.294  
 (0.0878)  (0.647)  
full 0.200  -0.0764  
 (0.124)  (0.565)  
age 0.000800 0.000860 0.00108 0.000859 
 (0.000879) (0.000877) (0.000914) (0.000891) 
privres -0.0291 -0.0286 -0.00664 -0.0292 
 (0.0561) (0.0533) (0.114) (0.109) 
nurshome -0.373*** -0.376*** -0.366*** -0.377*** 
 (0.0802) (0.0789) (0.111) (0.109) 
homeless 0.0771 0.0769 0.0979 0.0763 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.171) (0.166) 
male -0.0852*** -0.0856*** -0.0856*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
ethun -0.0372 -0.0376 -0.0381 -0.0377 
 (0.0729) (0.0720) (0.0719) (0.0724) 
white -0.288*** -0.287*** -0.281*** -0.287*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0834) (0.0849) (0.0837) 
black -0.125 -0.127 -0.129 -0.127 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.108) (0.106) 
asian -0.418*** -0.413*** -0.387*** -0.413*** 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.135) (0.128) 
pacisland -0.522** -0.531** -0.558** -0.530** 
 (0.217) (0.218) (0.238) (0.218) 
amerind -0.0814 -0.0754 -0.0363 -0.0760 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.188) (0.171) 
paypriv -0.0239 -0.0263 -0.0262 -0.0264 
 (0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0531) (0.0534) 
paymcare -0.0609 -0.0617 -0.0591 -0.0619 
 (0.0411) (0.0410) (0.0492) (0.0483) 
paymcaid 0.0368 0.0368 0.0452 0.0366 
 (0.0460) (0.0456) (0.0578) (0.0532) 
paywkcmp -0.0313 -0.0297 -0.0212 -0.0298 
 (0.0820) (0.0812) (0.0924) (0.0870) 
payself 0.0197 0.0206 0.0369 0.0202 
 (0.0660) (0.0651) (0.108) (0.0961) 
paynochg 0.286 0.289 0.304 0.289 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.206) (0.196) 
payoth 0.0540 0.0516 0.0438 0.0516 
 (0.0730) (0.0721) (0.0684) (0.0719) 
immediate -0.122* -0.119 -0.116 -0.118 
 (0.0712) (0.0721) (0.0846) (0.0805) 
urgent 0.200*** 0.204*** 0.216*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0526) (0.0575) (0.0523) 
cebvd -0.0487 -0.0444 -0.0312 -0.0445 
 (0.0928) (0.0905) (0.0892) (0.0900) 
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chf -0.285*** -0.288*** -0.304*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0827) (0.0837) (0.0989) (0.0914) 
eddial -0.211** -0.207** -0.201** -0.207** 
 (0.0917) (0.0922) (0.0962) (0.0919) 
edhiv 0.206* 0.214** 0.236** 0.214** 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.107) 
diabetes 0.0724** 0.0716** 0.0690* 0.0716** 
 (0.0337) (0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0335) 
resint 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.245*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0863) (0.0797) (0.0861) 
msa 0.338** 0.341*** 0.318 0.342* 
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.193) (0.189) 
northeast -0.0394 -0.0402 -0.0598 -0.0398 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.150) (0.144) 
midwest -0.167* -0.161* -0.150 -0.160* 
 (0.0865) (0.0893) (0.108) (0.0968) 
south -0.0104 -0.0123 -0.0224 -0.0122 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.115) (0.110) 
voluntary 0.272*** 0.269*** 0.259** 0.269*** 
 (0.101) (0.1000) (0.1000) (0.100) 
govnonfed 0.308* 0.314** 0.334** 0.314** 
 (0.157) (0.156) (0.162) (0.157) 
pov2 -0.0397 -0.0413 -0.0385 -0.0415 
 (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0504) (0.0526) 
pov3 -0.0484 -0.0453 -0.0335 -0.0454 
 (0.0679) (0.0669) (0.0610) (0.0660) 
pov4 0.0274 0.0364 0.0644 0.0363 
 (0.0733) (0.0735) (0.0741) (0.0707) 
income2 -0.00690 -0.00112 0.0219 -0.00130 
 (0.0529) (0.0534) (0.0764) (0.0591) 
income3 -0.0983 -0.0918 -0.0751 -0.0918 
 (0.0741) (0.0737) (0.0806) (0.0742) 
income4 -0.139* -0.132 -0.102 -0.132 
 (0.0809) (0.0807) (0.108) (0.0834) 
degree2 0.0309 0.0291 0.0165 0.0293 
 (0.0552) (0.0554) (0.0627) (0.0585) 
degree3 0.0206 0.0180 0.00622 0.0181 
 (0.0622) (0.0620) (0.0615) (0.0584) 
degree4 -0.0730 -0.0736 -0.0729 -0.0736 
 (0.0730) (0.0735) (0.0788) (0.0766) 
urbanrur1 0.119 0.117 0.0996 0.117 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.108) (0.104) 
urbanrur2 0.0810 0.0863 0.114 0.0860 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.135) (0.127) 
urbanrur3 0.00430 0.0138 0.0372 0.0138 
 (0.0904) (0.0917) (0.0983) (0.0906) 
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urbanrur4 0.179* 0.170* 0.162 0.170 
 (0.0921) (0.0902) (0.0984) (0.103) 
Constant 3.111*** 3.096*** 2.994*** 3.098*** 
 (0.230) (0.226) (0.410) (0.355) 
     
Observations 26,620 26,620 26,620 26,620 
R-squared 0.074 0.073 0.057 0.073 
 
Table 10: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto number of 
procedures.  This table shows two OLS models and two IV models. Sampling weights 
from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to make the estimates nationally representative.  
Standard errors are present in parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars 
next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Number of Procedures (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  -0.0294  0.0899 
  (0.0278)  (0.272) 
basic -0.0206  0.259  
 (0.0313)  (0.409)  
full -0.0625**  -0.0345  
 (0.0267)  (0.223)  
age 0.000848** 0.000827** 0.00113** 0.000912** 
 (0.000361) (0.000362) (0.000516) (0.000354) 
privres 0.0626* 0.0620** 0.109 0.0847 
 (0.0320) (0.0312) (0.0899) (0.0703) 
nurshome 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.184** 0.171** 
 (0.0441) (0.0437) (0.0806) (0.0706) 
homeless -0.0681 -0.0677 -0.0193 -0.0409 
 (0.0725) (0.0725) (0.134) (0.120) 
male 0.0581*** 0.0584*** 0.0595*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
ethun -0.0809*** -0.0809*** -0.0791*** -0.0798*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0301) (0.0264) 
white 0.00426 0.00396 0.0172 0.00982 
 (0.0303) (0.0305) (0.0348) (0.0305) 
black -0.0259 -0.0257 -0.0182 -0.0212 
 (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0405) (0.0352) 
asian 0.0579 0.0560 0.0960 0.0699 
 (0.0457) (0.0460) (0.0697) (0.0549) 
pacisland -0.0211 -0.0186 -0.0379 -0.0194 
 (0.0645) (0.0649) (0.0865) (0.0726) 
amerind -0.0259 -0.0279 0.0324 -0.00360 
 (0.0751) (0.0760) (0.127) (0.104) 
paypriv 0.0574*** 0.0582*** 0.0628** 0.0638*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0257) (0.0225) 
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paymcare -0.0199 -0.0193 -0.0155 -0.0153 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0280) (0.0267) 
paymcaid -0.0258 -0.0257 -0.0113 -0.0175 
 (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0293) (0.0237) 
paywkcmp 0.320*** 0.319*** 0.331*** 0.325*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0721) (0.0773) (0.0750) 
payself 0.0140 0.0137 0.0408 0.0270 
 (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0399) (0.0298) 
paynochg -0.0723 -0.0748 -0.0458 -0.0687 
 (0.0556) (0.0559) (0.0670) (0.0567) 
payoth -0.0698 -0.0689 -0.0778 -0.0701 
 (0.0490) (0.0484) (0.0643) (0.0541) 
immediate 0.0706 0.0691 0.0663 0.0623 
 (0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0507) (0.0449) 
urgent -0.0694* -0.0708** -0.0601 -0.0705* 
 (0.0361) (0.0358) (0.0474) (0.0381) 
cebvd -0.0236 -0.0246 -0.0148 -0.0230 
 (0.0305) (0.0303) (0.0395) (0.0325) 
chf 0.152** 0.153** 0.135* 0.147* 
 (0.0727) (0.0732) (0.0753) (0.0748) 
eddial 0.0195 0.0190 0.0122 0.0135 
 (0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0570) (0.0549) 
edhiv -0.0738 -0.0764 -0.0618 -0.0782 
 (0.0510) (0.0514) (0.0483) (0.0490) 
diabetes 0.0146 0.0147 0.0116 0.0131 
 (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0284) (0.0260) 
resint -8.55e-05 -0.000130 -0.00243 -0.00150 
 (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0510) (0.0458) 
msa -0.144** -0.145** -0.202 -0.178 
 (0.0700) (0.0702) (0.126) (0.118) 
northeast -0.0778* -0.0782* -0.102 -0.0927 
 (0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0678) (0.0584) 
midwest -0.0210 -0.0227 -0.0260 -0.0305 
 (0.0377) (0.0387) (0.0521) (0.0499) 
south -0.0245 -0.0237 -0.0375 -0.0279 
 (0.0460) (0.0464) (0.0569) (0.0510) 
voluntary -0.0708 -0.0699 -0.0744 -0.0691 
 (0.0510) (0.0507) (0.0619) (0.0536) 
govnonfed -0.0387 -0.0400 -0.0278 -0.0384 
 (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0734) (0.0669) 
pov2 -0.0133 -0.0129 -0.00203 -0.00571 
 (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0348) (0.0310) 
pov3 0.0282 0.0273 0.0388 0.0303 
 (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0413) (0.0353) 
pov4 -0.0176 -0.0203 0.00490 -0.0171 
 (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0460) (0.0341) 
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income2 0.000355 -0.00159 0.0244 0.00497 
 (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0339) (0.0225) 
income3 -0.0125 -0.0145 -0.00418 -0.0164 
 (0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
income4 0.0225 0.0203 0.0550 0.0304 
 (0.0349) (0.0354) (0.0546) (0.0419) 
degree2 -0.0409 -0.0403 -0.0577 -0.0473 
 (0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0426) (0.0390) 
degree3 -0.0515 -0.0503 -0.0698 -0.0561 
 (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0459) (0.0394) 
degree4 -0.00665 -0.00602 -0.00796 -0.00473 
 (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0371) (0.0362) 
urbanrur1 0.0162 0.0165 -0.00199 0.00779 
 (0.0475) (0.0469) (0.0567) (0.0467) 
urbanrur2 0.0493 0.0481 0.0812 0.0612 
 (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0762) (0.0611) 
urbanrur3 0.0382 0.0351 0.0557 0.0346 
 (0.0431) (0.0428) (0.0569) (0.0428) 
urbanrur4 0.00237 0.00527 0.0131 0.0201 
 (0.0349) (0.0354) (0.0607) (0.0586) 
Constant 0.526*** 0.531*** 0.372 0.465** 
 (0.0980) (0.0973) (0.257) (0.185) 
     
Observations 28,308 28,308 28,308 28,308 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.000 0.019 
 
Table 11: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto number of 
medications.  This table shows two OLS models and two IV models. Sampling weights 
from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to make the estimates nationally representative.  
Standard errors are present in parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars 
next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Number of Medications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  -0.0482  -0.139 
  (0.0437)  (0.414) 
basic -0.0146  0.0676  
 (0.0483)  (0.488)  
full -0.170**  -0.306  
 (0.0725)  (0.429)  
age 0.00187** 0.00178** 0.00202** 0.00173** 
 (0.000777) (0.000781) (0.000813) (0.000767) 
privres 0.0625 0.0682 0.0617 0.0500 
 (0.0806) (0.0841) (0.119) (0.132) 
nurshome -0.0827 -0.0728 -0.0905 -0.0883 
 (0.110) (0.113) (0.128) (0.141) 
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homeless -0.225 -0.213 -0.234 -0.233 
 (0.155) (0.158) (0.178) (0.189) 
male 0.0315* 0.0321* 0.0309 0.0311 
 (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0203) 
ethun -0.0675 -0.0651 -0.0705 -0.0658 
 (0.0469) (0.0471) (0.0469) (0.0476) 
white 0.0136 0.0219 0.00405 0.0167 
 (0.0717) (0.0784) (0.0702) (0.0836) 
black -0.00353 0.00571 -0.0149 0.00173 
 (0.0762) (0.0814) (0.0759) (0.0845) 
asian 0.0784 0.0781 0.0830 0.0673 
 (0.0999) (0.103) (0.120) (0.122) 
pacisland 0.216 0.234 0.191 0.233 
 (0.177) (0.179) (0.182) (0.172) 
amerind -0.0660 -0.0628 -0.0626 -0.0827 
 (0.174) (0.180) (0.207) (0.210) 
paypriv 0.0838** 0.0894** 0.0778* 0.0849* 
 (0.0397) (0.0408) (0.0404) (0.0433) 
paymcare -0.0260 -0.0222 -0.0299 -0.0259 
 (0.0392) (0.0400) (0.0427) (0.0450) 
paymcaid 0.0223 0.0253 0.0207 0.0190 
 (0.0445) (0.0456) (0.0495) (0.0509) 
paywkcmp 0.151 0.153 0.151 0.148 
 (0.0926) (0.0928) (0.0951) (0.0949) 
payself 0.0636 0.0647 0.0661 0.0540 
 (0.0460) (0.0473) (0.0675) (0.0641) 
paynochg -0.167* -0.175** -0.153 -0.180** 
 (0.0865) (0.0888) (0.0977) (0.0908) 
payoth 0.174* 0.181* 0.165* 0.181* 
 (0.0973) (0.100) (0.0928) (0.104) 
immediate 0.308*** 0.302*** 0.314*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0739) (0.0744) (0.0733) 
urgent 0.0568 0.0514 0.0645 0.0511 
 (0.0519) (0.0518) (0.0563) (0.0513) 
cebvd -0.120 -0.124* -0.115 -0.125* 
 (0.0759) (0.0725) (0.0822) (0.0727) 
chf 0.271*** 0.275*** 0.264** 0.279** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.108) (0.108) 
eddial -0.0265 -0.0272 -0.0274 -0.0221 
 (0.0871) (0.0872) (0.0946) (0.0927) 
edhiv 0.0353 0.0260 0.0479 0.0269 
 (0.0945) (0.0979) (0.0927) (0.0978) 
diabetes 0.0262 0.0269 0.0249 0.0278 
 (0.0410) (0.0406) (0.0423) (0.0414) 
resint 0.0360 0.0359 0.0357 0.0368 
 (0.0494) (0.0508) (0.0484) (0.0524) 
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msa -0.260*** -0.267*** -0.261 -0.241 
 (0.0964) (0.0986) (0.183) (0.193) 
northeast -0.133* -0.132 -0.140 -0.122 
 (0.0796) (0.0824) (0.0934) (0.0944) 
midwest -0.0231 -0.0258 -0.0208 -0.0218 
 (0.0793) (0.0837) (0.0811) (0.0843) 
south -0.123 -0.117 -0.132 -0.115 
 (0.0828) (0.0861) (0.0812) (0.0829) 
voluntary -0.0834 -0.0819 -0.0858 -0.0812 
 (0.0983) (0.101) (0.0959) (0.101) 
govnonfed -0.0868 -0.0909 -0.0809 -0.0913 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.114) 
pov2 0.0105 0.0143 0.00758 0.00842 
 (0.0380) (0.0394) (0.0440) (0.0465) 
pov3 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.00893 -0.0128 
 (0.0408) (0.0421) (0.0389) (0.0420) 
pov4 -0.0358 -0.0420 -0.0260 -0.0452 
 (0.0550) (0.0561) (0.0602) (0.0599) 
income2 0.0396 0.0332 0.0503 0.0283 
 (0.0413) (0.0409) (0.0504) (0.0464) 
income3 -0.0210 -0.0265 -0.0140 -0.0249 
 (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0518) (0.0485) 
income4 -0.0524 -0.0577 -0.0418 -0.0658 
 (0.0654) (0.0656) (0.0851) (0.0765) 
degree2 -0.00881 -0.00584 -0.0150 -0.000594 
 (0.0397) (0.0404) (0.0548) (0.0535) 
degree3 -0.0483 -0.0431 -0.0573 -0.0388 
 (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0664) (0.0586) 
degree4 0.0439 0.0463 0.0411 0.0453 
 (0.0634) (0.0631) (0.0650) (0.0624) 
urbanrur1 0.0199 0.0261 0.00903 0.0320 
 (0.0614) (0.0622) (0.0679) (0.0626) 
urbanrur2 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.182** 0.165** 
 (0.0597) (0.0591) (0.0808) (0.0756) 
urbanrur3 0.150** 0.143** 0.159** 0.143** 
 (0.0692) (0.0711) (0.0742) (0.0704) 
urbanrur4 0.111 0.126 0.0940 0.114 
 (0.0794) (0.0809) (0.0898) (0.0890) 
Constant 0.879*** 0.872*** 0.868*** 0.924*** 
 (0.215) (0.228) (0.292) (0.303) 
     
Observations 29,255 29,255 29,255 29,255 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 
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Table 12: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto number of diagnostic 
tests.  This table shows two OLS models and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 
2009 NHAMCS were used to make the estimates nationally representative.  Standard 
errors are present in parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to 
the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Number of Diagnostic Tests (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  -0.0425  1.145 
  (0.0902)  (0.750) 
basic -0.0138  1.492  
 (0.0999)  (1.073)  
full -0.149  0.879  
 (0.117)  (0.950)  
age 0.0182*** 0.0182*** 0.0194*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.00172) (0.00170) (0.00219) (0.00187) 
privres 0.0598 0.0579 0.330 0.280 
 (0.135) (0.133) (0.243) (0.201) 
nurshome 0.303 0.306 0.521* 0.497** 
 (0.193) (0.191) (0.275) (0.251) 
homeless -0.378* -0.377* -0.0791 -0.123 
 (0.223) (0.222) (0.331) (0.293) 
male -0.0841** -0.0835** -0.0720* -0.0713* 
 (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0405) (0.0402) 
ethun -0.0829 -0.0825 -0.0761 -0.0754 
 (0.0741) (0.0744) (0.105) (0.0947) 
white -0.0665 -0.0672 -0.00718 -0.0192 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.150) (0.136) 
black -0.230* -0.229* -0.195 -0.198 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.168) (0.153) 
asian 0.256 0.250 0.434* 0.383* 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.235) (0.222) 
pacisland -0.0654 -0.0571 -0.107 -0.0675 
 (0.258) (0.256) (0.427) (0.373) 
amerind -0.277 -0.284 0.0255 -0.0460 
 (0.350) (0.352) (0.424) (0.394) 
paypriv 0.112 0.115 0.168 0.169* 
 (0.0912) (0.0907) (0.105) (0.101) 
paymcare 0.149 0.150 0.194* 0.193** 
 (0.0952) (0.0949) (0.0997) (0.0978) 
paymcaid -0.0260 -0.0256 0.0651 0.0524 
 (0.0868) (0.0865) (0.116) (0.107) 
paywkcmp -0.530*** -0.531*** -0.465*** -0.481*** 
 (0.150) (0.151) (0.164) (0.161) 
payself -0.00640 -0.00734 0.156 0.127 
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 (0.0779) (0.0785) (0.154) (0.131) 
paynochg -0.448*** -0.457*** -0.347 -0.398** 
 (0.170) (0.173) (0.211) (0.194) 
payoth -0.0791 -0.0766 -0.0979 -0.0849 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.201) (0.184) 
immediate 0.931*** 0.927*** 0.872*** 0.864*** 
 (0.244) (0.245) (0.275) (0.263) 
urgent -0.0232 -0.0279 -0.00330 -0.0252 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.219) (0.204) 
cebvd 0.458*** 0.455*** 0.487*** 0.469*** 
 (0.150) (0.148) (0.173) (0.163) 
chf 0.756*** 0.759*** 0.677*** 0.701*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.131) (0.117) 
eddial 0.384* 0.383* 0.318 0.322 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.227) (0.222) 
edhiv 0.424* 0.416* 0.439* 0.403* 
 (0.234) (0.236) (0.236) (0.234) 
diabetes 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.271*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0791) (0.0787) (0.0790) 
resint 0.0317 0.0311 0.0125 0.0129 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.152) (0.142) 
msa 0.000209 -0.00207 -0.381 -0.331 
 (0.150) (0.151) (0.283) (0.248) 
northeast -0.0791 -0.0809 -0.231 -0.215 
 (0.166) (0.168) (0.273) (0.253) 
midwest 0.246 0.240 0.191 0.178 
 (0.181) (0.183) (0.266) (0.255) 
south 0.199 0.201 0.153 0.169 
 (0.186) (0.187) (0.235) (0.231) 
voluntary -0.249 -0.246 -0.257 -0.244 
 (0.212) (0.211) (0.238) (0.221) 
govnonfed -0.493** -0.496** -0.467* -0.484** 
 (0.227) (0.228) (0.249) (0.238) 
pov2 0.0724 0.0739 0.154 0.147 
 (0.0690) (0.0692) (0.100) (0.0943) 
pov3 0.0891 0.0866 0.136 0.119 
 (0.0952) (0.0957) (0.131) (0.120) 
pov4 -0.0611 -0.0700 0.00987 -0.0367 
 (0.0847) (0.0862) (0.139) (0.108) 
income2 -0.0884 -0.0948 0.00737 -0.0329 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.151) (0.124) 
income3 -0.123 -0.130 -0.129 -0.154 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.130) (0.122) 
income4 -0.0261 -0.0338 0.121 0.0672 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.187) (0.164) 
degree2 -0.00341 -0.00130 -0.0934 -0.0711 
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 (0.0902) (0.0912) (0.113) (0.106) 
degree3 -0.0409 -0.0367 -0.125 -0.0955 
 (0.0824) (0.0837) (0.0996) (0.0934) 
degree4 0.0977 0.0997 0.103 0.110 
 (0.0978) (0.0992) (0.127) (0.125) 
urbanrur1 -0.217* -0.216* -0.317* -0.298* 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.187) (0.168) 
urbanrur2 -0.0476 -0.0520 0.127 0.0828 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.200) (0.165) 
urbanrur3 -0.0963 -0.106 -0.0610 -0.106 
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.160) (0.126) 
urbanrur4 0.209 0.218 0.355 0.368 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.268) (0.249) 
Constant 1.056** 1.072** 0.239 0.426 
 (0.483) (0.487) (0.793) (0.688) 
     
Observations 28,868 28,868 28,868 28,868 
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.013 0.027 
 
 
Table 13: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto number of diagnostic 
tests.  This table shows two OLS models and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 
2009 NHAMCS were used to make the estimates nationally representative.  Standard 
errors are present in parentheses.  P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to 
the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Ambulance Diversion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  -0.476**  -5.200 
  (0.230)  (3.144) 
basic -0.463*  -5.734  
 (0.243)  (5.228)  
full -0.564  -4.658  
 (0.403)  (5.154)  
age 0.00599 0.00570 0.0190 0.0208 
 (0.00565) (0.00586) (0.0221) (0.0168) 
privres 1.200 1.249 -2.217 -2.435 
 (0.919) (0.893) (4.072) (3.288) 
nurshome -0.936 -0.882 -2.862 -3.242 
 (1.134) (1.088) (4.426) (3.174) 
male -0.444 -0.440 1.253 1.079 
 (0.281) (0.279) (1.824) (1.203) 
ethun -0.517 -0.518 -0.440 -0.435 
 (0.476) (0.477) (1.047) (0.989) 
white 0.359 0.357 0.378 0.398 
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 (0.454) (0.454) (0.844) (0.754) 
black 0.545 0.536 0.0345 0.160 
 (0.468) (0.474) (1.618) (1.087) 
pacisland 0.571 0.561 -3.051 -2.676 
 (1.129) (1.125) (4.295) (2.994) 
paypriv -0.489 -0.489 -3.049 -2.854 
 (0.378) (0.379) (2.649) (1.918) 
paymcare 0.0244 0.0326 -2.073 -1.991 
 (0.489) (0.496) (1.823) (1.497) 
paymcaid -0.282 -0.292 -2.832 -2.538 
 (0.352) (0.345) (2.947) (1.823) 
payself -0.435 -0.440 -4.434 -4.079 
 (0.454) (0.454) (4.109) (2.790) 
paynochg 0.0760 0.0856 -5.885 -5.521 
 (0.773) (0.782) (5.469) (3.966) 
immediate 0.969** 0.952* 4.023 3.955* 
 (0.474) (0.479) (2.524) (2.284) 
urgent 0.0108 -0.00208 3.320 3.191 
 (0.344) (0.347) (2.691) (2.381) 
cebvd -0.490 -0.474 -1.346 -1.434 
 (0.599) (0.586) (2.018) (1.807) 
chf -1.012 -1.003 -1.507 -1.563 
 (0.642) (0.642) (1.594) (1.451) 
diabetes 1.030** 1.034** -0.619 -0.527 
 (0.439) (0.443) (2.174) (1.838) 
resint 1.385*** 1.383*** -0.422 -0.267 
 (0.448) (0.456) (2.244) (1.932) 
msa -1.111 -1.129 1.176 1.171 
 (0.773) (0.785) (1.987) (1.825) 
northeast -0.388 -0.394 1.141 1.085 
 (0.374) (0.375) (1.577) (1.342) 
midwest -1.053*** -1.058*** -0.884 -0.852 
 (0.348) (0.345) (0.936) (0.803) 
south -0.366 -0.372 -0.644 -0.565 
 (0.419) (0.410) (1.144) (0.896) 
voluntary 0.611* 0.613* 1.668 1.574* 
 (0.328) (0.325) (1.162) (0.850) 
govnonfed 0.753** 0.760** 1.199 1.100 
 (0.362) (0.358) (1.229) (0.848) 
pov2 -0.337 -0.330 -1.436 -1.416 
 (0.545) (0.545) (1.673) (1.500) 
pov3 -0.0799 -0.0806 1.767 1.632 
 (0.580) (0.584) (1.987) (1.648) 
pov4 -1.805** -1.830** 1.888 1.850 
 (0.776) (0.807) (3.012) (2.779) 
income2 -1.510*** -1.517*** -0.304 -0.327 
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 (0.421) (0.426) (1.141) (1.006) 
income3 -1.316** -1.335** 1.297 1.288 
 (0.504) (0.522) (2.130) (1.932) 
income4 -0.874 -0.886 1.307 1.260 
 (0.653) (0.671) (2.043) (1.792) 
degree2 -0.158 -0.155 1.369 1.226 
 (0.344) (0.339) (1.541) (1.070) 
degree3 -0.122 -0.115 2.164 1.923 
 (0.505) (0.499) (2.475) (1.549) 
degree4 -1.013* -1.014* 0.693 0.566 
 (0.535) (0.537) (1.817) (1.371) 
urbanrur1 2.469*** 2.491*** 2.138 1.949 
 (0.906) (0.930) (2.294) (1.757) 
urbanrur2 2.055*** 2.072*** -0.0285 -0.0362 
 (0.727) (0.748) (2.044) (1.858) 
urbanrur3 1.453* 1.464* 0.847 0.780 
 (0.738) (0.753) (1.628) (1.381) 
urbanrur4 0.800 0.816 -0.948 -0.972 
 (0.873) (0.885) (2.040) (1.886) 
Constant 4.807*** 4.797*** 3.441 3.643 
 (1.449) (1.451) (3.282) (2.696) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.656 0.656   
 
Table 12: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto wait times when 
patient acuity is held constant at the “immediate” level.  This table shows two OLS 
models and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to 
make the estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in parentheses.  
P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Wait Time (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  0.122  -0.230 
  (0.107)  (0.556) 
basic 0.0664  -0.708  
 (0.116)  (0.758)  
full 0.317**  0.261  
 (0.160)  (0.840)  
age -0.00389*** -0.00375** -0.00423*** -0.00370** 
 (0.00148) (0.00150) (0.00148) (0.00146) 
privres -0.0107 -0.0166 -0.0637 -0.0566 
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.171) (0.136) 
nurshome -0.494** -0.516** -0.506* -0.560** 
 (0.205) (0.208) (0.268) (0.232) 
homeless 0.0539 0.0429 0.123 0.0640 
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 (0.455) (0.471) (0.431) (0.481) 
male -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.158*** -0.166*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0510) (0.0537) (0.0503) 
ethun -0.0670 -0.0665 -0.0676 -0.0661 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.132) (0.118) 
white -0.229 -0.225 -0.245 -0.227 
 (0.142) (0.140) (0.173) (0.149) 
black -0.0839 -0.0815 -0.124 -0.101 
 (0.158) (0.156) (0.187) (0.167) 
asian -0.360 -0.313 -0.447 -0.286 
 (0.227) (0.236) (0.286) (0.256) 
pacisland -0.685** -0.714** -0.532 -0.674** 
 (0.320) (0.328) (0.354) (0.338) 
amerind -0.325 -0.310 -0.352 -0.299 
 (0.377) (0.358) (0.447) (0.359) 
paypriv -0.0426 -0.0471 -0.0588 -0.0639 
 (0.0826) (0.0830) (0.101) (0.0877) 
paymcare 0.130 0.128 0.114 0.115 
 (0.0860) (0.0862) (0.0906) (0.0859) 
paymcaid -0.00132 -0.000467 -0.0658 -0.0359 
 (0.0911) (0.0911) (0.122) (0.108) 
paywkcmp -0.203 -0.224 -0.116 -0.210 
 (0.245) (0.250) (0.274) (0.263) 
payself 0.0561 0.0654 -0.0486 0.0208 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.131) (0.123) 
paynochg 0.590** 0.619*** 0.525* 0.630*** 
 (0.230) (0.221) (0.315) (0.236) 
payoth 0.0444 0.0478 -0.0149 0.0195 
 (0.181) (0.178) (0.218) (0.194) 
cebvd 0.219 0.225 0.213 0.232 
 (0.238) (0.236) (0.236) (0.225) 
chf -0.188 -0.196 -0.102 -0.159 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.154) (0.140) 
eddial -0.161 -0.175 -0.247 -0.247 
 (0.241) (0.243) (0.282) (0.277) 
edhiv 0.183 0.201 0.136 0.204 
 (0.232) (0.228) (0.278) (0.240) 
diabetes 0.141* 0.139* 0.172* 0.154* 
 (0.0814) (0.0831) (0.0950) (0.0892) 
resint 0.0712 0.0796 0.136 0.130 
 (0.135) (0.133) (0.201) (0.164) 
msa 0.0880 0.0968 0.274 0.217 
 (0.147) (0.146) (0.312) (0.260) 
northeast 0.159 0.177 0.173 0.212 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.197) (0.157) 
midwest -0.188 -0.152 -0.228 -0.118 
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 (0.129) (0.140) (0.163) (0.157) 
south 0.133 0.148 0.135 0.175 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.167) (0.133) 
voluntary -0.116 -0.110 -0.155 -0.121 
 (0.145) (0.141) (0.209) (0.163) 
govnonfed 0.0737 0.114 -0.0664 0.0989 
 (0.169) (0.173) (0.282) (0.191) 
pov2 -0.0883 -0.0962 -0.121 -0.128 
 (0.0829) (0.0825) (0.119) (0.101) 
pov3 -0.162* -0.160* -0.184* -0.169* 
 (0.0878) (0.0877) (0.110) (0.0984) 
pov4 -0.139 -0.119 -0.195 -0.118 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.145) (0.124) 
income2 -0.119 -0.0958 -0.195 -0.102 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.134) (0.0970) 
income3 -0.250** -0.227* -0.267* -0.198 
 (0.119) (0.122) (0.151) (0.139) 
income4 -0.302** -0.282* -0.342** -0.272* 
 (0.146) (0.144) (0.162) (0.139) 
degree2 0.0904 0.0898 0.110 0.1000 
 (0.0798) (0.0818) (0.0924) (0.0861) 
degree3 0.0262 0.0249 0.0491 0.0357 
 (0.0927) (0.0909) (0.0984) (0.0848) 
degree4 -0.158 -0.159 -0.213 -0.190 
 (0.136) (0.133) (0.140) (0.138) 
urbanrur1 0.416*** 0.415*** 0.436*** 0.425*** 
 (0.155) (0.154) (0.159) (0.147) 
urbanrur2 0.307* 0.307* 0.169 0.229 
 (0.156) (0.161) (0.242) (0.220) 
urbanrur3 0.248* 0.273* 0.0908 0.224 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.213) (0.164) 
urbanrur4 0.177 0.157 0.172 0.122 
 (0.206) (0.204) (0.227) (0.216) 
Constant 3.574*** 3.512*** 4.027*** 3.669*** 
 (0.301) (0.292) (0.505) (0.390) 
     
Observations 33,942 33,942 33,942 33,942 
R-squared 0.080 0.077  0.059 
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Table 13: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto wait times when 
patient acuity is held constant at the “urgent” level.  This table shows two OLS models 
and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to make the 
estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in parentheses.  P-values 
are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Wait Time (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  0.0926  -0.0188 
  (0.0829)  (0.500) 
basic 0.0712  0.419  
 (0.0905)  (0.805)  
full 0.167  -0.312  
 (0.128)  (0.594)  
age 0.00167* 0.00171* 0.00208* 0.00166* 
 (0.000952) (0.000944) (0.00106) (0.000963) 
privres -0.0168 -0.0166 0.0132 -0.0362 
 (0.0590) (0.0568) (0.131) (0.114) 
nurshome -0.330*** -0.331*** -0.318*** -0.346*** 
 (0.0854) (0.0841) (0.119) (0.105) 
homeless 0.0572 0.0582 0.107 0.0297 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.231) (0.205) 
male -0.0798*** -0.0801*** -0.0801*** -0.0821*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0178) 
ethun -0.0439 -0.0446 -0.0476 -0.0461 
 (0.0783) (0.0776) (0.0779) (0.0786) 
white -0.290*** -0.290*** -0.274*** -0.297*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0884) (0.103) (0.0899) 
black -0.125 -0.126 -0.126 -0.133 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.126) (0.119) 
asian -0.434*** -0.431*** -0.389** -0.448*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.170) (0.143) 
pacisland -0.481** -0.486** -0.519** -0.488** 
 (0.226) (0.227) (0.260) (0.228) 
amerind 0.0968 0.103 0.193 0.0706 
 (0.185) (0.184) (0.294) (0.228) 
paypriv -0.0246 -0.0264 -0.0332 -0.0314 
 (0.0469) (0.0464) (0.0524) (0.0514) 
paymcare -0.0910* -0.0917* -0.0914* -0.0951* 
 (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0537) (0.0529) 
paymcaid 0.0302 0.0299 0.0374 0.0229 
 (0.0472) (0.0466) (0.0563) (0.0496) 
paywkcmp -0.0529 -0.0517 -0.0374 -0.0555 
 (0.0930) (0.0924) (0.110) (0.0980) 
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payself -0.00429 -0.00463 0.00895 -0.0158 
 (0.0675) (0.0668) (0.107) (0.0895) 
paynochg 0.335 0.337 0.374 0.322 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.245) (0.228) 
payoth 0.0564 0.0542 0.0313 0.0583 
 (0.0695) (0.0694) (0.0788) (0.0717) 
cebvd -0.133 -0.131 -0.103 -0.135 
 (0.0867) (0.0851) (0.0854) (0.0832) 
chf -0.329*** -0.332*** -0.362*** -0.327*** 
 (0.0996) (0.101) (0.123) (0.104) 
eddial -0.182* -0.177* -0.154 -0.165 
 (0.0932) (0.0922) (0.108) (0.110) 
edhiv 0.126 0.131 0.161 0.133 
 (0.100) (0.0984) (0.103) (0.0965) 
diabetes 0.0707* 0.0700* 0.0650* 0.0700* 
 (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0389) (0.0375) 
resint 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.297*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0884) (0.0871) (0.0791) (0.0918) 
msa 0.369** 0.371*** 0.352* 0.398** 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.197) (0.186) 
northeast -0.106 -0.108 -0.150 -0.0925 
 (0.122) (0.124) (0.182) (0.153) 
midwest -0.167* -0.164 -0.153 -0.157 
 (0.0980) (0.101) (0.142) (0.114) 
south -0.0524 -0.0552 -0.0841 -0.0505 
 (0.116) (0.121) (0.149) (0.129) 
voluntary 0.278*** 0.274** 0.233** 0.281*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.114) (0.103) 
govnonfed 0.278* 0.280* 0.292* 0.283* 
 (0.161) (0.160) (0.168) (0.162) 
pov2 -0.0285 -0.0292 -0.0239 -0.0368 
 (0.0526) (0.0525) (0.0608) (0.0595) 
pov3 -0.0177 -0.0153 0.00896 -0.0188 
 (0.0740) (0.0734) (0.0685) (0.0731) 
pov4 0.0743 0.0805 0.135 0.0754 
 (0.0770) (0.0765) (0.0907) (0.0768) 
income2 0.00452 0.00804 0.0458 0.000638 
 (0.0593) (0.0596) (0.0953) (0.0689) 
income3 -0.0694 -0.0650 -0.0334 -0.0634 
 (0.0798) (0.0793) (0.0900) (0.0810) 
income4 -0.139 -0.135 -0.0840 -0.145 
 (0.0843) (0.0838) (0.134) (0.0897) 
degree2 0.00363 0.00216 -0.0185 0.00861 
 (0.0567) (0.0569) (0.0637) (0.0582) 
degree3 -0.00221 -0.00453 -0.0258 -0.00213 
 (0.0629) (0.0632) (0.0649) (0.0618) 
 
 
63 
degree4 -0.0632 -0.0638 -0.0638 -0.0665 
 (0.0734) (0.0740) (0.0848) (0.0803) 
urbanrur1 0.0877 0.0853 0.0554 0.0936 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.117) (0.107) 
urbanrur2 0.0989 0.103 0.158 0.0894 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.168) (0.140) 
urbanrur3 -0.0376 -0.0307 0.0177 -0.0280 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.123) (0.103) 
urbanrur4 0.210** 0.204** 0.176 0.190 
 (0.100) (0.0986) (0.107) (0.120) 
Constant 3.269*** 3.265*** 3.150*** 3.324*** 
 (0.253) (0.251) (0.489) (0.392) 
     
Observations 28,815 28,815 28,815 28,815 
R-squared 0.067 0.066 0.022 0.064 
 
Table 14: Regression results for the multiple models regressed onto wait times when 
patient acuity is held constant at the “nonurgent” level.  This table shows two OLS 
models and two IV models. Sampling weights from the 2009 NHAMCS were used to 
make the estimates nationally representative.  Standard errors are present in parentheses.  
P-values are indicated by the number of stars next to the coefficient value (*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Wait Time (1) (2) (3) (4) 
basic_or_full  0.0997  0.717 
  (0.104)  (0.593) 
basic 0.0561  0.991  
 (0.104)  (0.738)  
full 0.389*  1.823  
 (0.219)  (1.401)  
age 0.000187 0.000244 0.00115 0.000891 
 (0.00143) (0.00144) (0.00193) (0.00178) 
privres -0.198* -0.174* -0.0951 -0.0876 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.143) (0.134) 
nurshome -0.382** -0.361* -0.301 -0.291 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.205) (0.187) 
homeless 0.214 0.215 0.280 0.255 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.305) (0.262) 
male 0.00426 0.00462 0.0173 0.0130 
 (0.0436) (0.0429) (0.0481) (0.0437) 
ethun -0.0190 -0.00811 -0.0902 -0.0420 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.163) (0.133) 
white -0.311** -0.305** -0.364** -0.332** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.167) (0.136) 
black -0.172 -0.167 -0.322 -0.256 
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 (0.158) (0.160) (0.249) (0.199) 
asian -0.321 -0.317 -0.368 -0.342 
 (0.347) (0.343) (0.376) (0.344) 
pacisland -0.554*** -0.572*** -0.741*** -0.704*** 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.280) (0.256) 
amerind -0.296* -0.297* -0.308* -0.305* 
 (0.152) (0.153) (0.183) (0.169) 
paypriv -8.22e-05 -0.00389 0.124 0.0692 
 (0.0974) (0.0987) (0.143) (0.125) 
paymcare -0.160 -0.159 -0.0666 -0.101 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.160) (0.137) 
paymcaid 0.132 0.139 0.220* 0.200* 
 (0.0843) (0.0857) (0.117) (0.104) 
paywkcmp 0.0905 0.102 0.111 0.124 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.205) (0.183) 
payself 0.109 0.120 0.269 0.229 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.177) (0.159) 
paynochg 0.00377 -0.0126 0.0767 0.0174 
 (0.160) (0.170) (0.221) (0.202) 
payoth 0.113 0.108 0.0549 0.0676 
 (0.188) (0.185) (0.183) (0.177) 
cebvd -0.189 -0.181 -0.195 -0.177 
 (0.271) (0.266) (0.358) (0.311) 
chf -0.122 -0.128 -0.0230 -0.0716 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.232) (0.207) 
eddial -0.840* -0.829 -0.962* -0.894 
 (0.507) (0.520) (0.556) (0.555) 
edhiv 0.789** 0.815** 0.816* 0.856** 
 (0.397) (0.399) (0.428) (0.412) 
diabetes -0.104 -0.104 -0.0475 -0.0697 
 (0.0986) (0.0988) (0.111) (0.104) 
resint 0.0161 0.0306 0.167 0.137 
 (0.156) (0.160) (0.223) (0.203) 
msa 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.186 0.286 
 (0.159) (0.155) (0.295) (0.223) 
northeast 0.219 0.235 0.0379 0.138 
 (0.164) (0.163) (0.262) (0.192) 
midwest -0.159 -0.143 -0.117 -0.103 
 (0.142) (0.138) (0.237) (0.185) 
south 0.173 0.168 0.244 0.206 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.186) (0.164) 
voluntary 0.347** 0.351** 0.580** 0.499** 
 (0.137) (0.140) (0.233) (0.212) 
govnonfed 0.478* 0.498* 0.665** 0.631** 
 (0.258) (0.260) (0.294) (0.278) 
pov2 -0.0348 -0.0394 -0.102 -0.0850 
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 (0.101) (0.102) (0.108) (0.102) 
pov3 -0.0976 -0.0968 -0.105 -0.101 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.121) (0.106) 
pov4 -0.0471 -0.0299 -0.102 -0.0479 
 (0.144) (0.150) (0.182) (0.159) 
income2 0.0236 0.0299 0.0613 0.0590 
 (0.0723) (0.0754) (0.0896) (0.0831) 
income3 -0.127 -0.129 0.00582 -0.0487 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.150) (0.134) 
income4 0.206 0.202 0.374* 0.301* 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.216) (0.180) 
degree2 0.146* 0.147* 0.0269 0.0751 
 (0.0746) (0.0747) (0.112) (0.0960) 
degree3 0.154 0.169 -0.0207 0.0741 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.180) (0.129) 
degree4 -0.111 -0.105 -0.188 -0.148 
 (0.111) (0.109) (0.133) (0.108) 
urbanrur1 -0.0496 -0.0512 -0.207 -0.150 
 (0.191) (0.194) (0.247) (0.232) 
urbanrur2 -0.248 -0.225 -0.378* -0.283 
 (0.185) (0.190) (0.207) (0.211) 
urbanrur3 -0.0313 -0.0215 -0.130 -0.0736 
 (0.161) (0.158) (0.161) (0.155) 
urbanrur4 0.0839 0.0758 0.301 0.202 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.282) (0.213) 
Constant 3.048*** 2.990*** 2.525*** 2.614*** 
 (0.267) (0.277) (0.499) (0.443) 
Observations 33,747 33,747 33,747 33,747 
R-squared 0.128 0.124  0.070 
 
 
 
 
 
